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INTRODUCTION 
Courts in this country have long recognized the dangers of eyewitness testimony: 
"[T]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts 
for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor." United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 229 (1967). Indeed, in its effort to address concerns about the risk of 
eyewitness misidentification, this Court has been on the forefront of efforts to incmporate 
social science research findings into the law governing the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,493 (Utah 1986); State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Concerns about eyewitness misidentification are particularly 
acute where, as here, the testimony of a single eyewitness is the sole evidence of a 
defendant's guilt. 
This case presents this Court with an opportunity to re-examine the legal 
framework for assessing eyewitness identification evidence, a task it has not done in the 
30 years since it decided Ramirez. Over that period, social scientists have conducted 
extensive research in the area of eyewitness memory and perception that has significantly 
advanced our understanding of how memory works and what factfinders know about 
human memory. During the same period, the work of organizations like Amicus Curiae 
the Innocence Project have shed light on the role of eyewitness misidentification in 
contributing to wrongful convictions established through post-conviction DNA testing. 
Indeed, eyewitness misidentification is the leading contributing cause of wrongful 
convictions established through DNA, playing a role in 72 percent of 342 DNA 
exonerations to date. 
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These developments, together with this Court's commitment to ensuring that the 
law governing eyewitness identification evidence is fully aligned with the findings of 
social science research, require revisiting and updating Ramirez, as both the majority and 
dissenting judges in the court below agreed. 
Scientific research amply supports the Court of Appeals' ruling that the witness's 
identifications of Mr. Lujan should not have been admitted. The conditions under which 
Mr. Lujan was identified-the poor lighting, the fact that the perpetrator wore a hat and 
was of a different race than the victim, and that the victim experienced high levels of 
stress at the time he claimed to have viewed Mr. Lujan-have all been shown to 
negatively affect memory. State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,r 2,357 P.3d 20. 
Likewise, scientific research confirms that suggestive circumstances like those 
surrounding the show-up and in-court identifications in this case influence not only the 
reliability of the identification itself, but also the many self-reported factors that the 
Ramirez test relies on to determine the admissibility of a challenged identification. 
This research can help to explain why the witness, who had three opportunities to 
identify Mr. Lujan, was only able to do so where suggestive circumstances made that 
identification obvious-first, at a highly suggestive show-up, where Mr. Lujan was 
handcuffed and was the only person not in a police uniform, id. ,r 6, and then in an in-
court identification at a preliminary hearing, where Mr. Lujan was the "only defendant at 
counsel table" and the only reasonable choice, id. ,r 8. In contrast, the witness was unable 
to identify Mr. Lujan when he was presented as part of a six person lineup that was fairly 
composed and administered. Id. ,r 7. The witness's inability to identify Mr. Lujan in the 
2 
absence of suggestive circumstances that communicated to him that Mr. Lujan was the 
perpetrator suggests that the witness had not formed a reliable memory of the perpetrator 
at the time of the crime such that he could make a later accurate identification. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the State had not 
carried its burden of showing that the trial court's admission of the eyewitness 
identification was harmless error. Studies have shown that jurors tend to overvalue 
eyewitness testimony, overestimate the likely accuracy of eyewitness testimony, and 
confuse an eyewitness's certainty with his or her accuracy. Because the eyewitness's 
testimony was crucial to the prosecution, the admission of the eyewitness identifications 
was not harmless error. Id. ,r 17 ("When the man's identifications of Defendant are 
removed, the State's case is severely weakened."). 
Accordingly, this Court should affinn the Court of Appeals' decision and take this 
opportunity to revisit Ramirez in light of the last three decades of social science research 
and data from the DNA exonerations. In so doing, this Court should reaffirm that the 
appropriate approach to such evidence is a totality of the circumstances test that allows 
for trial courts to consider any relevant factors based on a consensus in social science 
research and should clarify what factors now enjoy a consensus in the social science 
research. Moreover, this Court should provide guidance to the lower courts on the use of 
intermediate remedies, including expert testimony, robust jury instructions, and limits on 
unreliable aspects of admissible eyewitness testimony, which can blunt the prejudicial 
effects of identification testimony that is the product of suggestive procedures or that may 
be unreliable, but is nonetheless admissible. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. TIIlS COURT SHOULD REVISIT THE RAA11REZ FRAMEWORK BECAUSE 
IT IS UNDERMINED BY DECADES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
A. This Court Has Recognized and Attempted to Guard Against the Dangers 
of Eyewitness Testimony for Decades 
This Court first recognized and attempted to address the dangers of eyewitness 
identification testimony thirty years ago. It was one of the first state supreme courts in 
the country to do so. In State v. Long, the Court reviewed the scientific literature and 
concluded that it was "replete with empirical studies documenting the unreliability of 
eyewitness identification." 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986). The Long Court also 
recognized that, "[a]lthough research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses 
inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these 
problems." Id at 490. To address these concerns, the Court required trial courts to give 
cautionary instructions on eyewitness identification testimony when requested by the 
defense in appropriate cases. This instruction would be used to "pinpoint identification 
as a central issue and highlight the factors that bear on the reliability of that 
identification." Id. at 492. 
The Court revisited the issue of eyewitness identification testimony five years later 
in State v. Ramirez. The Court's opinion in that case reiterated its commitment to 
tackling the problems posed by eyewitness testimony through the application of scientific 
research findings to judicial decision making. The Ramirez Court established a 
framework for the admissibility of eyewitness identifications that required "an in-depth 
appraisal of the identification's reliability," 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991), and that 
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rejected the federal standard, which the Court found to be "scientifically unsound." Id. at 
779-81. Critical to the Court's decision was its view that the scientific literature, which 
it had described and relied on in Long, compelled it to adopt "an analytic course that 
diverges somewhat from that in federal case law." Id at 780. 
This Court most recently sought to refine its approach to eyewitness testimony in 
State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103. There, the Court focused on the fact that 
"[d]ecades of study ... have established that eyewitnesses are prone to identifying the 
wrong person as the perpetrator of the crime." Id ,r 15. In light of that concern, it sought 
to align Utah's rules of evidence with the latest research on expert eyewitness 
identification testimony. Id. ,r,r 14, 16-18, 21-25, 30, 34 (recognizing that cautionary 
instructions and cross-examination were "poor substitutes" for expert eyewitness 
testimony and holding that the Utah rules of evidence should allow for "liberal and 
routine admission" of such testimony). Although this Court has revisited issues relating 
to eyewitness identification testimony as part of its commitment to tackling this difficult 
issue, the Ramirez framework for assessing the reliability and the admissibility of such 
testimony remains in place. When it was issued in 1991, Ramirez represented an 
important step forward in this area. But the same commitment to aligning the law with 
scientific research on eyewitness identification that this Court has shown in cases such as 
Clopten, now highlights the need to revisit the framework established in Ramirez.1 
1 Indeed, because it took current scientific research into account to modify the law on the 
admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony, Clopten calls the viability of the Ramirez 
test into question. The modifications requested by the Innocence Project would bring the 
Ramirez test into line with Clopten. 
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B. Social Science Research Since Ramirez Demonstrates that the Ramirez 
Factors Are Insufficient to Protect Defendants from the Dangers of 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony 
The Ramirez test requires trial courts to consider the "totality of the 
circumstances," which "must" include five enumerated factors: 
( 1) "The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 
(2) [T]he witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; 
(3) [T]he witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; 
( 4) [W]hether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and 
( 5) [T]he nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This last area includes such 
factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer 
during the time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same 
as the observer's." 
817 P.2d at 781. 
The Ramirez Court set itself apart from federal and other state supreme courts by 
applying a test that was expressly designed to "meet or exceed in rigor the federal 
standard as expressed in Biggers and Stovall." Id at 780. Rejecting some of the federal 
test's criteria as "scientifically unsound," the Court refined the factors in the federal test, 
expressly including consideration of race, and expressly rejecting witness certainty as an 
indicator of reliability. Id. at 780-81. In other respects, the Ramirez test mirrored the 
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federal test, however. Both include the "opportunity of the witness to view" the 
perpetrator during the crime, and the "witness's degree of attention," factors that are, in 
many cases, evidenced by the witness's own reporting of events which can undermine 
reliability. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972). 
Although Ramirez relied explicitly on then-current scientific studies, research in 
the field has continued to advance. Indeed, current social science research demonstrates 
that the Ramirez factors are insufficient to protect defendants from the dangers of faulty 
eyewitness identifications. Most importantly, in the 25 years since Ramirez, scientists 
studying eyewitness memory have come to understand more fully the power of 
suggestion. Today, research has demonstrated that suggestive circumstances can both 
(1) significantly impair a witness's ability to make an accurate identification; and 
(2) artificially inflate a witness's testimony concerning the other factors that remain part 
of both the federal and Utah tests. 
Neither of these concerns is adequately addressed in the Ramirez test. That test 
buries the issue of suggestion in factor four: "whether the witness's identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion." 817 P.2d at 781 (emphasis added). This treatment of suggestion is both 
inaccurate and incomplete. First, it incorrectly implies that identifications that are 
spontaneous and consistent have not been tainted by suggestive circumstances. In truth, 
social scientists agree that suggestive circumstances can lead to a witness being more 
consistent and insistent in his or her identification. See Charles A. Goodsell et al., Effects 
of Mugshot Commitment on Lineup Performance in Young and Older Adults, 23 Applied 
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Cognitive Psycho!. 788, 789 (2009); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Mugshot Exposure 
Effects: Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commihnent, Source Confusion, and 
Unconscious Transference, 30 Law & Hum. Behav. 287,299 (2006). Thus, in 
considering factor four, courts may conclude that an identification is reliable and 
admissible because it was spontaneous and the witness was consistent, even if the very 
reason it appears reliable is that the identification was tainted by suggestion. 
Second, and more problematic, the Ramirez test fails to identify or offer courts 
guidance on how to address the pernicious effect of suggestive circumstances on witness 
memory, including as manifested in the other factors courts are required to consider. 
Indeed, in the 25 years since Ramirez, scientists have shown that that when an 
identification procedure is tainted by suggestion, that suggestion can contaminate a 
witness's memory of the event, undermining the accuracy of the evidence most likely to 
be used to gauge reliability-the witness's own testimony. Many studies have 
characterized at least two of the Ramirez factors-opportunity to view and degree of 
attention-as prone to this problem. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, 
"Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of 
the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psycho!. 360, 366-67 (1998) (finding that the 
effect of suggestion was "large or very large" on witnesses' "reports of certainty, view, 
ability to make out features of the face, attention, basis for making an identification, the 
amount of time taken to make an identification, willingness to testify, and trust of an 
identification made under these conditions"). Because suggestive circumstances can 
influence a witness's memory and recollection of both the original event and the 
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identification procedure itself, courts should be wary of basing a finding of reliability on 
these factors, which depend largely on witness testimony. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that these flaws are inherent in the 
federal test in State v. Henderson, 21 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). It observed that "[t]he irony 
of the current test is that the more suggestive the procedure, the greater the chance 
eyewitnesses will seem confident and report better viewing conditions." Id. at 918. 
Indeed, since Henderson, other courts and the prestigious National Academy of Science 
have highlighted the same flaw in the federal test. See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 
687 (Or. 2012); Youngv. State, Nos. A-11006/11015, 2016 WL 3369222, at *16 (Alaska 
June 17, 2016); National Academy of Sciences, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing 
Eyewitness Identification, at 65-66, available at http://www.nap.edu/read/18891/ 
chapter/6#65 (''NAS Report"). Even though Ramirez improves upon the federal test in 
this regard-by rejecting a balancing approach and focusing on reliability as the primary 
concern-Ramirez does not go far enough to solve the problems identified in Henderson. 
Under Ramirez, trial courts are instructed to consider "self-reported" factors, but are not 
given guidance on how suggestion can influence those factors or how it can undermine 
the reliability of an identification more generally. Thus, although the Ramirez test takes 
suggestive circumstances into consideration, as it should, it fails to adequately account 
for the interplay between suggestive circumstances and the other factors. 
In addition, since Ramirez, scientific research has confirmed and reinforced that 
witness memory-and therefore accuracy-can be affected dramatically by factors that 
are present at the time of the crime (known as "estimator variables," including stress, the 
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presence of a weapon, the race of the witness and the perpetrator, and disguises as 
seemingly minor as hats) and factors that are present at the time of the identification 
procedure( s) (known as "system variables," including the use of an administrator who 
does not know the identity of the suspect, pre-lineup witness instructions, and fair 
composition of the identification procedure). See, e.g., Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence, Report & Recommendations to the Justices, 
at 59-71 (July 25, 2013), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/ 
eyewitness-evidence-report-2013.pdf ("SJC Report"); NAS Report at 65-69. The 
importance of these factors should not be overlooked; indeed, they likely undermined the 
reliability of the eyewitness identification in this case. This Court should talce into 
account this extensive body of research and consider the effect that these variables can 
have on witness memory. 
Ensuring that the law remains aligned with the last 25 years of scientific research 
requires revisiting Ramirez. Both the majority and dissent in the Court of Appeals agreed 
that it is time for this Court to revisit Ramirez, and Amicus Curiae respectfully asks this 
Court to do the same. See Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,r 10 n.l ("All of this, talcen 
together, indicates that it is time for our Supreme Court to reconsider Ramirez, a 
proposition with which the dissent agrees."). 
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C. This Court Should Confirm that Ramirez Requires a Totality of the 
Circumstances Approach, with Expert Testimony and Procedural 
Safeguards, to Limit the Harmful Prejudicial Effects of Unreliable 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony 
In order to address the problems with the Ramirez test, this Court should, first, 
reiterate and reemphasize the importance of the "totality of the circumstances" nature of 
the Ramirez test. The Court should also give guidance to the lower courts sufficient to 
allow them to give meaning to the term and to do so in a way that is consistent across the 
state. Amicus Curiae respectfully submits that this Court should instruct the lower courts 
to consider the "totality" of factors that are supported by a consensus of social science 
research and to take this opportunity to identify and explain those factors that currently 
enjoy such consensus. The Court should emphasize nevertheless that the list of factors 
courts should consider in evaluating eyewitness identification evidence should be flexible 
enough to allow for the evolution of the relevant science, in recognition of the fact that 
scientific research is dynamic. As the Supreme Courts ofNew Jersey and Connecticut 
have instructed, "'[t]rial courts [should not be limited] from reviewing evolving, 
substantial, and generally accepted scientific research."' State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 
735 (Conn. 2012) (quoting Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922); see also Lawson, 291 P.3d at 
685-86 (recognizing that "research is ongoing" and cautioning that the court's 
acknowledgment of the current research "is not intended to preclude any party ... from 
validating scientific acceptance of further research"). 
In other words, judicial understanding of the term "totality of the circumstances" 
should be given full force and effect: lower courts should consider the universe of factors 
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that bear on reliability in the particular case, regardless of whether any particular factor 
fits neatly into the five "reliability" factors enumerated in Ramirez. Emphasizing the fact 
that the Ramirez test requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including 
all system and estimator variables, the degree of suggestiveness, if any, and the effect of 
that suggestion on other factors, would reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions 
based on suggestive identification procedures, like the show-up and in-court 
identification used in this case, or identifications that scientific research shows are 
otherwise likely to be unreliable. 
We respectfully submit that, to accomplish this goal, the Court should issue 
findings on the current body of scientific research to guide lower courts on the factors 
they should consider in assessing the admissibility and reliability of eyewitness 
identifications. This Court should make these findings by evaluating the current body of 
research on its own as the Oregon Supreme Court did in State v. Lawson,2 by appointing 
a special master3 or creating a study group, 4 or by adopting the findings set forth by other 
2 (See Lawson appendix attached as Addendum A.) 
3 The New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a special master to evaluate scientific 
evidence on eyewitness testimony. The special master heard testimony from seven 
experts that produced more than 2,000 pages of transcripts and reviewed hundreds of 
scientific studies. The special master issued an "extensive" 86-page report that the court 
later reviewed and adopted in part. See Henderson, 21 A.3d at 877. 
4 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts convened a study group on eyewitness 
identification to "offer guidance as to how our courts can most effectively deter 
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures and mirumize the risk of a wrongful 
conviction." SJC Report at 1; Commonwealth v. Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195, 208 n.16 
(Mass. 2011) (announcing that the court will convene the study committee "[b]ecause 
eyewitness identification is the greatest source of wrongful convictions but also an 
12 
courts, as the Alaska Supreme Court did in State v. Young. After issuing such findings, 
the Supreme Court of Oregon articulated an approach to the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification that screens eyewitness identification testimony through a stringent and 
precise application of the rules of evidence. 5 Any of these approaches, if adopted here, 
would address the problems of the Ramirez test and ensure that trial courts throughout the 
state will evaluate identification evidence in light of more than thirty years of generally 
accepted scientific research findings about memory, perception and eyewitness 
reliability. 
The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Lawson is instructive in this regard. 
There, the court sua sponte conducted a review of the social science research concerning 
eyewitness identification, reviewing more than 2,000 scientific studies. Lawson, 291 
P.3d at 685. After concluding that the Manson/Biggers factors incorporated in the 
Oregon state test for evaluating identification evidence6 did not adequately ensure the 
reliability of eyewitness identification evidence, it took judicial notice of scientific 
invaluable law enforcement tool ... and because the research regarding eyewitness 
identification procedures is complex and evolving"). The study group issued its report in 
2013, and the Supreme Judicial Court has ruled on its recommendations as they are 
presented in cases before the court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 
900 (Mass. 2015) (adopting provisional jury instructions based on the study group's 
findings). 
5 Alternatively, the Court could instruct the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Evidence to analyze current scientific research and reform the rules of evidence 
accordingly. 
6 The Manson/Biggers factors that were incorporated into Oregon's test for the 
admissibility of eyewitness identifications prior to Lawson contained some of the same 
factors found in Ramirez: the witness's opportunity to view the crime and the witness's 
degree of attention to the perpetrator. See Lawson, 291 P.3d at 684. 
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research findings and set out a comprehensive list of the variables courts should consider 
in weighing the reliability of this type of evidence. (See Addendum A.) The Lawson 
court explained its approach: 
[W] e believe that it is imperative that law enforcement, the bench, and the 
bar be informed of the existence of current scientific research and literature 
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification because ... the 
reliability of eyewitness identification is central to a criminal justice system 
dedicated the dual principles of accountability and fairness. 
Id. at 685. This same principle applies equally here. The list of factors that can affect the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications is long and is not always well understood by 
litigants, jurists or jurors. By setting forth the factors that trial courts should consider in 
evaluating eyewitness identification evidence, this Court can encourage courts and 
factfinders to bring the law as it is practiced every day in courts throughout the state into 
alignment with current scientific research. In addition, requiring courts to consider 
relevant system variables, such as blind administration, fair lineup construction, pre-
lineup instructions, and recorded, contemporaneous witness confidence statements will 
have the salutary effect of reducing the suggestiveness of out-of-court identification 
procedures, as well as in-court identification procedures that are based on out-of-court 
identifications. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska recently took a similar approach to this issue in a 
decision issued in June of this year. In State v. Young, it rejected its state version of the 
Manson/Biggers test and adopted a new test to evaluate the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications, aligning their standard with the findings in Lawson and Henderson. 
Young, 2016 WL 3369222 at *19. The court concluded its extensive analysis of the 
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scientific research findings by holding that courts' "analysis of reliability should consider 
all relevant system and estimator variables under the totality of the circumstances." Id at 
*29. 
This Court should follow its sister courts in Alaska, Oregon, and New Jersey in 
comprehensively identifying the relevant system and estimator variables that trial courts 
and factfinders should consider when evaluating the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications. Identifying what scientific research currently considers the relevant 
variables while emphasizing the need to remain flexible to allow for the evolving nature 
of scientific research in the area will ensure that lower courts will evaluate the reliability 
of eyewitness identification through an approach that gives meaning to the term "totality 
of the circumstances," and, most importantly, will reduce the risk of misidentification. 
In addition, where eyewitness identification testimony is ruled admissible, trial 
courts should use intermediate remedies, such as expert testimony and robust jury 
instructions, to blunt the prejudicial effects of any remaining unreliability and to provide 
jurors with context and information to appropriately analyze this evidence. Although 
courts have historically relied on cross-examination and closing arguments to expose the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony, social science research has shown-
and this Court itself has recognized-that these methods are largely ineffective at 
bringing the unreliability of a mistaken but honest witness's identification to light. See, 
e.g., Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 1121-22 ("[R]esearch shows the effectiveness of cross-
examination is badly hampered [ where eyewitnesses express certainty about 
identifications that are inaccurate]."); accord Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 725-28; State v. 
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Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 299-300 (Tenn. 2007) (citing scientific studies 
demonstrating that cross-examination is insufficient to educate the jury on the relevant 
factors). 
Likewise, as this Court has also recognized, robust, carefully written jury 
instructions that are grounded in science and tailored to the facts of the case should be 
used to caution jurors that the factors that affect reliability may be counterintuitive. See 
Long, 721 P .2d at 492. As with Ramirez, Utah was a leader in adopting an eyewitness-
specific jury instruction that referenced scientific research findings. See Utah Model Jury 
Instruction CR404, available at https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/ 
inc _list.asp?action=showRule&id=32. Recently, however, courts and commentators 
have concluded that instructions that comprehensively address all relevant factors that 
may have affected the reliability of the identification is necessary. Such instructions will 
provide jurors-who are often unfamiliar with, or hold views counter to, the scientific 
research findings-sufficient guidance to evaluate eyewitness identification evidence. 
The eyewitness-specific jury instructions recently adopted by Massachusetts and New 
Jersey off er excellent examples of modem instructions that accomplish this goal. See 
Gomes, 22 N.E.3d at 900 (adopting provisional jury instructions that were "intended to 
provide the jury with the guidance they need to capably evaluate the accuracy of an 
eyewitness identification" because "the research makes clear that common sense is not 
enough to accurately discern the reliable eyewitness identification from the unreliable") 7; 
7 (See also Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions on eyewitness identifications attached 
as Addendum B.) 
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New Jersey Supreme Court, Jury Instructions (July 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.judiciary .state.nj.us/pressreV2012/jury _ instruction. pdf. 8 
II. CONSIDERATION OF THE ONGOING ADl\flSSJBILITY OF EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE IS NOT AN ENLARGEJvIBNT OF THE 
ISSUES 
In its response to the Innocence Project's Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae 
Brief (the "Motion"), the State suggests that any argument that the Ramirez test is 
outdated and should be replaced "has never been made in this case and would enlarge the 
issues and the evidence before this Court." (State's Resp. to Mot. for Leave to File 
Amicus Curiae Br. ("State's Resp.") at 3--4.) Accordingly, the State argues that this 
Court is unable to reach the "expanded issue" raised by the Innocence Project, and the 
State reserves the right to move to strike the present brief. (Id at 4-5.) With all due 
respect, the State's position is preposterous. 
The Court should reject the State's position for at least two reasons. First, this 
Court may consider the Innocence Project's position regarding the sufficiency of the 
Ramirez test because the parties themselves have raised the issue. Second, this Court 
8 Even if the Court were to refrain from modifying the Ramirez test in light of 
advancements in social science research, that research supports the lower court's 
suppression of the challenged show-up and in-court identifications. (See generally Br. of 
Resp't on Cert. Review ("Br. ofResp't").) The Court of Appeals correctly found that 
facts relating to each of the five Ramirez factors weighed in favor of inadmissibility. See, 
e.g., Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,r,r 11-19. 
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may consider social science research because it is valuable reference material that does 
not expand the evidentiary record.9 
A. This Court Can Consider the Sufficiency of the Ramirez Test Because it 
Bears on Issues Presented by Both Parties to this Court 
Although an amicus brief cannot extend or enlarge the issues on appeal, this brief 
makes arguments "that bear on the issues pursued by the parties to [an] appeal." Madsen, 
658 P.2d at 629 n.3. As this Court has explained, "[r]eview on certiorari is limited to 
examining the court of appeals' decision and is further circumscribed by the issues raised 
in the petitions." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998). The 
statement of question presented, however, "will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary 
question fairly included therein." Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4); see also Willardson v. Indus. 
Comm 'n of Utah, 904 P.2d 671, 673-74 (Utah 1995) (considering subsidiary issue to be 
included in issue framed for review). Furthermore, "this rule should be construed 
broadly to avoid the rigid exclusion of reviewable issues, however peripheral." State v. 
Leber, 2009 UT 59, ,r 10,216 P.3d 964 (quoting Sevy v. Sec. Title Co., 902 P.2d 629,637 
(Utah 1995)). Contrary to the State's suggestion that the issue "has never been made in 
this case," its own petition for certiorari repeatedly referenced the Court of Appeals' 
9 The State mischaracterizes the relevant case law in arguing that the introduction of an 
alternative test to Ramirez would enlarge the issues before this Court. Even accepting 
those cases it cites at face value, however, both are easily distinguishable from the 
present case. fu United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell and Madsen v. Borthick, the 
parties had not pursued the issue that the amicus brief discussed. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981); Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627,629 n.3 
(Utah 1983). In the present case, the Utah Court of Appeals, the State's brief, and the 
defendant's brief all discuss whether Ramirez should be reexamined. Lujan, 2015 UT 
App 199, ,r 10 n.1; Br. of Pet'r at 19; Br. ofResp't at 25-31. 
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invitation to this Court to revisit the Ramirez test. (See, e.g., Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at 
10.) 
Throughout its petition, the State criticized the Court of Appeals for its treatment 
of Ramirez and its recommendations to this Court. The State claimed the majority 
merely "paid lip service to Ramirez," while "it in effect imposed a standard exceeding 
that required in Ramirez." (Id) The State also took issue with the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that the Ramirez standard "does not accurately reflect the changed views 
about handling this problematic evidence." (Id (quoting Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,r 10 
n.l); see also id. at 17 (same).) Accordingly, the State specifically asked this Court to 
grant certiorari "to clarify that state due process does not require the exclusion of 
eyewitness identification unless it determines that it results from an unnecessarily 
suggestive police identification procedure." (Id. at 17.) 
In its opening brief before this Court, the State reiterated many of the same issues 
it raised in its petition. Specifically, the State noted that "[b]nth the majority and the 
dissent urged review of the Ramirez standard for the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification testimony, citing its age, the continuing legal and scientific concerns about 
the reliability of eyewitness identifications, and the outcome in this case." (Br. of Pet'r at 
19.) And once again, the State implored this Court to "clarify the state due process 
standard announced in Ramirez and reverse the court of appeals." (Id; see id at 16-17 
( asking the Court to "clarify its state due process model governing the admissibility of 
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eyewitness identifications"); 29 ( asking the Court to "clarify Ramirez to prevent further 
confusion about and misapplication of the state due process analysis").)10 
Similarly, in his merits brief, the defendant raises concerns about Ramirez and 
responds directly to the State's complaints. (See, e.g., Br. ofResp't at 25-31.) Because 
both parties have made arguments concerning the Court of Appeals' recommendation 
that this Court revisit the Ramirez test, the Innocence Project's brief does not extend or 
enlarge the issues on appeal. 
Accordingly, the Innocence Project respectfully requests that this Court consider 
the present brief in its entirety and reject any attempt by the State to strike any portion of 
it. To the extent the Court agrees with the State that portions of this brief extend or 
enlarge the issues on appeal, the Innocence Project respectfully requests that the court 
deny the motion to strike in part and consider the portions of the brief that "bear on the 
issues pursued by the parties to this appeal." Madsen, 658 P.2d at 629 n.3. 
B. This Court Can Consider Social Science Research in Deciding to Affirm 
the Court of Appeals' Decision 
Even if the Court disagrees with the Innocence Project and finds that the issue of 
the sufficiency of the Ramirez test was not raised before by the parties, 11 the Court may 
still consider the social science literature cited in this brief. 
10 In addition, the State cites various studies regarding eyewitness testimony and appends 
them to its opening brief. (See id. at 39-40, 43-44, 45, 47, Addendum D.) 
11 Counsel for Mr. Lujan, in its brief before the Court of Appeals, noted this Court's 
review of the relevant scientific literature, which it described as "replete with empirical 
studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness identification." (Br. of Appellant at 
7-8 (citing Ramirez and Long).) Similarly, the State cited various studies regarding 
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The State has suggested that consideration of such literature would result in an 
enlargement of the evidence. As discussed above, however, this Court has long 
considered social science research to be a valuable resource, particularly in the context of 
eyewitness identification evidence. See, e.g., Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ,r,r 8, 15-38 
( discussing at length the social science research surrounding "eyewitness fallibility and 
the resulting possibility of mistaken identifications"); Long, 721 P.2d at 492 (Utah 1986) 
( considering the Court to be "compelled by the overwhelming weight of the empirical 
research to take steps to alleviate the difficulties inherent in any use of eyewitness 
identification testimony"). Other state supreme courts agree. See, e.g., Lawson, 291 P.3d 
at 685-86 (noting that "it is imperative that law enforcement, the bench, and the bar be 
informed of the existence of current scientific research and literature regarding the 
reliability of eyewitness identification"); Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 720 (holding that experts 
may testify about the reliability of eyewitness identifications due to the "near perfect 
scientific consensus" and "broad based judicial recognition" that "eyewitness 
identifications are potentially unreliable in a variety of ways unknown to the average 
juror," as evidenced by scientific research on the topic); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 877 
( adopting findings of court-appointed special master and finding that scientific evidence 
presented "convincing proof that the current test for evaluating the trustworthiness of 
eyewitness identifications should be revised," and noting that " [ s ]tudy after study 
revealed a troubling lack of reliability in eyewitness identifications"). 
eyewitness testimony and appends them to its opening brief. (See Br. of Pet'r at 39-40, 
43-44, 45, 47, Addendum D.) 
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The social science research cited by the Innocence Project is analogous to 
"legislative facts," which are those that "inform policy-making decisions, as opposed to 
adjudicative facts which are facts distinctive to a particular case." Cruz v. Middlekauff 
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1259 n.1 (Utah 1996) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring) (citing Robert E. Keeton, Judging 38-39 (1990); Utah R. Evid. 201 advisory 
committee's note). Justice Zimmerman, in explaining "[t]he propriety of considering 
legislative facts in making policy decisions" cited a decision by the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District ofNew York, which held that: 
A court's power to resort to less well known and accepted sources of data 
to fill in the gaps of its knowledge for legislative and general evidential 
hypothesis purposes must be accepted because it is essential to the judicial 
process. 
Id. (quoting Bulova Watch Co. v. K Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981)); accord State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 129 n.114 (Conn. 2015) ("To turn a blind 
eye to relevant and well established scientific or sociological knowledge that the parties 
may have overlooked or decided to leave unearthed, whether for strategic or financial 
reasons, would unjustly and unwisely subject the public at large to the results of an ill-
informed decision."); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307,323 (D.C. 1995) 
("[C]ourts traditionally answer questions of legislative fact, and thus questions of law, not 
only by referring to evidence of record but also by considering non-record sources such 
as scientific and social science studies found in law reviews and other journals."). 
A recent case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is 
instructive on the issue of the applicability of social science research. In Young v. 
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Conway, Amicus Curiae the Innocence Project presented the court with a "robust and 
growing body of high-quality scientific studies addressing problems surrounding 
eyewitness identifications." Youngv. Conway, 715 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2013). The 
Second Circuit ultimately decided to reference the studies in its opinion, "conclud[ing] 
that it was a good idea to make trial judges aware of the existence of this inf onnation, in 
effect, as additional tools to help them with their work." Id. In so doing, the court made 
clear that it merely "aims to point the bench and bar to the existence of the studies and to 
go no further." Id. In fact, the opinion itself is explicit that the court's conclusion was 
not "compelled or controlled" by the literature it cited; rather, they merely reinforced the 
conclusion the court reached. Youngv. Conway, 698 F.3d 69, 79 n.8 (2d Cir. 2012). 
This Court should continue to consider social science literature as an important 
tool in ensuring that it takes all appropriate steps to alleviate the difficulties inherent in 
the use of eyewitness identification testimony. 
ill. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD WHEN 
IT REQUIRED THE STATE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ANY ERROR IN 
ADMISSION OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION WAS HARMLESS 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
~ Under Utah law, the introduction of an unreliable eyewitness identification is a 
constitutional violation. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-81. Because the introduction of 
the tainted identification testimony in this case violated Defendant-Respondent's 
constitutional right to due process, the Court of Appeals held that the State had the 
burden of showing that the eyewitness identification testimony was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,r 16. This conclusion was a straightforward 
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application of this Court's precedent. Where the error in question amounts to a violation 
of a defendant's constitutional rights, its "harmlessness is to be judged by a higher 
standard, i.e., reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419,425 (Utah 1995). 
This Court's approach to harmless error analysis is based on the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). That decision, in turn, is 
based on the simple principle that the courts are responsible for protecting constitutional 
rights. In establishing the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, the Chapman 
Court recognized that courts possessed the "responsibility to protect" federal 
constitutional rights so that "[p]etitioners are entitled to a trial free from the pressure of 
unconstitutional inferences." Id at 21, 26. The Court recognized that "there are some 
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as 
harmless error" and that an infringement of those rights would render the trial 
unconstitutional. Id. at 23. The same considerations apply here. Defendant-Respondent 
is entitled to a trial free from the pressure of unconstitutional inferences from eyewitness 
testimony fraught with issues of unreliability. 
Social science research on the extent to which jurors rely on eyewitness testimony 
underscores how critical the harmless error standard is. Because jurors tend to 
"overbelieve" eyewitness testimony to an extent that is not warranted by the facts, the 
admission of eyewitness testimony that is unreliable can be extraordinarily harmful. See, 
e.g., JenniferN. Sigler & James V. Couch, Eyewitness Testimony and the Jury Verdict, 4 
N. Am. J. Psycho!. 143, 146 (2002) (finding that the conviction rate by mock juries 
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increased from 49% to 68% when a single, vague eyewitness account was added to 
circumstantial evidence). In addition, a study of the first 250 DNA exonerations 
concluded that over 75 percent of those wrongful convictions involved mistaken 
eyewitness identification. Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal 
Prosecutions Go Wrong 8-9 (2011 ). The fact that 7 5 percent of wrongful convictions 
involve mistaken eyewitness identifications counsels in favor of courts adhering to their 
"responsibility to protect" defendants and their right to a trial free of tainted eyewitness 
identification testimony. 
The fact that the error identified by the Court of Appeals may have been solely a 
violation of the Utah Constitution does not change this analysis. Just as federal courts 
have the responsibility to safeguard defendants' federal constitutional rights, so too do 
the courts of this state have the parallel responsibility to safeguard defendants' rights 
under the state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415,421 (Utah 1991) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring). A violation of a defendant's state constitutional rights is 
no less serious than a violation of his rights under the U.S. Constitution. Even if federal 
constitutional rights are not implicated, the State has the burden of proving that an error 
resulting in a Utah state constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This Court has held that Utah's inquiry into due process is "as stringent as, if not more 
stringent than, the federal analysis." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. There is no reason to 
relax that level of concern for defendants' constitutional rights in the context of adopting 
an appropriate standard of review. Insisting that the State demonstrate that the 
introduction of tainted eyewitness identification testimony was harmless beyond a 
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reasonable doubt ensures that this Court can uphold its responsibility to protect 
defendants. See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1240 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) ("The framers of the Utah Constitution necessarily intended that this Court 
should be ... the primary protector of individual liberties.") 
This approach is consistent with the law of other states. A number have adopted 
the Chapman standard for violations under their respective state constitutions. See Van 
Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3, 11 (Del. 1987) ("[R]eversal is required whenever the 
reviewing court cannot say that the error was beyond a reasonable doubt."); State v. 
Perry, 245 P.3d 961,974 (Idaho 2010) ("Idaho shall from this point forward employ the 
Chapman harmless error test for all objected-to error."); State v. Bunch, 689 S.E.2d 866, 
868 (N.C. 2010) (applying Chapman for jury-instruction error violating state 
constitution). Similarly, a number of states require the prosecution to bear the burden of 
proving that the error was harmless, although the standard is lower than beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of Montana, for example, has held that "the state 
will carry the burden of persuading the Court ... that the violation was harmless." State 
v. Charlie, 239 P.3d 934,945 (Mont. 2010) (emphasis removed). Similarly, the Supreme 
Court of Alaska held that the prosecution must assume the burden of proving that the 
error was harmless. Bostic v. State, 805 P.2d 344, 347 (Alaska 1991) (noting that the 
defendant is the "non-offending party" and that placing the burden on him would be 
"manifestly unjust"). 
Moreover, Connecticut and the District of Columbia have extended the Chapman 
standard to violations of state law. See State v. Artis, 101 A.3d 915,928 (Conn. 2014) 
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(holding that state had burden of proving that admission of identification testimony was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988, 1004 (D.C. 
2005) (applying Chapman to statement admitted in violation of court's precedent). 
This Court should make clear that the State has the burden of proving that errors 
infringing upon state constitutional rights are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Amicus Curiae the funocence Project respectfully 
requests that, in light of current social science research, this Court revise the framework it 
set out in Ramirez, issue guidance on the importance of the ''totality of the 
circumstances" approach, and instruct the lower courts on intermediate remedies, in 
accordance with the principles articulated above. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
STATE OF OREGON, 
Respondent on Review, 
v. 
SAMUEL ADAM LAWSON, 
Petitioner on Review. 
(CC 03CR1469FE; CA A132640; SC S059234 (Control)) 
STATE OF OREGON, 
v. 
STANLEY DALE JAMES, JR., 
(CF080348; CA Al40544; SC S059306) 
(Consolidated for opinion) 
En Banc 
On review from the Court of Appeals.* 
Argued and submitted November 14, 2011. 
Respondent on Review, 
Petitioner on Review. 
Daniel J. Casey, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on 
review Samuel Adam Lawson. Ryan T. O'Connor, Senior Deputy Public Defender, 
Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review 
Stanley Dale James, Jr. With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender. 
Anna Marie Joyce, Solicitor General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on 
review. With her on the brief were John R Kroger, Attorney General, and Andrew M. 
Lavin, Assistant Attorney General. 
Ramon A. Pagan, Janet Hoffman & Associates, LLC, Portland, filed a brief on 
behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. 
1 
Matthew G. McHenry, Levine & McHenry LLC, Portland, filed a brief on behalf 
of amicus curiae The Innocence Network. 
Marc Sussman, Marc Sussman, P.C., Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus 
curiae College and University Professors Solomon Fulero et al. 
Margaret Garvin and Sarah LeClair, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus 
curiae National Crime Victim Law Institute. 
DEMUNIZ,J. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court in State 
v. Lawson are reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals in State v. James is affirmed. 
* Appeal from Douglas County Circuit Court, Ronald Poole, Judge. 239 Or App 
363, 244 P3d 860 (2010). 
* Appeal from Umatilla County Circuit Court, Thomas W. Kolberg, Judge. 240 Or 
App 324, 245 P3d 705 (2011 ). 
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1 APPENDIX 
2 Set out below is a summary of the scientific research and literature this 
3 court examined for these cases, organized according to the categories of variables --
4 estimator and system -- identified in that body of work. As described in our opinion, 
5 estimator variables generally refer to characteristics of the witness, the perpetrator, and 
6 the environmental conditions of the event that cannot be manipulated or adjusted by state 
7 actors. In contrast, system variables refer to the circumstances of the identification 
8 procedure itself that generally are within the control of those administering the procedure. 
9 I. ESTIMATOR VARIABLES 
10 A. Stress 
11 High levels of stress or fear can have a negative effect on a witness's ability 
12 to make accurate identifications. Although moderate amounts of stress may improve 
13 focus in some circumstances, research shows that high levels of stress significantly 
14 impair a witness's ability to recognize faces and encode details into memory. See Charles 
15 A. Morgan ill et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encountered During 
16 Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 Int'l J L & Psychiatry 265, 275-76 (2004) (so 
17 stating). When under high amounts of stress, witnesses are often unable to remember 
18 particular details -- like facial features or clothing - that are not immediately relevant to 
19 the basic survival response triggered by adrenaline and other hormones that are released 
20 in highly stressful situations. Id. 
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1 A meta-analysis12 of 27 independent studies conducted on the effects of 
2 stress on identification accuracy showed that, while 59 percent of the 1,727 participants 
3 correctly identified the target individual in a target-present lineup after a low-stress 
4 encounter, only 39 percent did so after high-stress encounters. Kenneth A. Deffenbacher 
5 et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 
6 Law & Hum Behav 687 (2004). In another study, military survival school participants 
7 were subje~ted to two 40-minute interrogations, each by different interrogators, following 
8 a 12-hour period of confmement without food and sleep in a mock prisoner of war camp. 
9 Morgan, Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory, 27 Int'l J L & Psychiatry 265 (2004). One 
10 interrogation was conducted under high-stress conditions, involving physical 
11 confrontation, while the other was conducted under low-stress conditions, involving only 
12 deceptive questioning. Id. When asked the next day to identify their interrogators, only 
13 30 percent of the participants correctly identified their high-stress interrogator, while 60 
14 percent correctly identified their low-stress interrogator. Id. The study also noted an 
15 associated increase in false identifications -- 56 percent of the participants falsely 
16 identified another person as their high-stress interrogator, compared to 38 percent who 
12 A meta-analysis is a type of study in which researchers combine and 
analyze the results of multiple previously published studies on a certain subject in order 
to evaluate their cumulative fmdings in a broader context, and over larger sample sizes. 
Meta-analyses do not involve conducting any new experiments, but are nevertheless 
highly regarded in the scientific community for their ability to synthesize a large amount 
of data and illustrate a general consensus in a particular field See Roy S. Malpass et al., 
The Need for Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, in Expert 
Testimony on the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification 14 (B. Cutler ed, 2009) 
( describing utility of meta-analytic studies). 
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did so with regard to their low-stress interrogator. Id 
The negative effect of stress on the reliability of eyewitness identifications 
contradicts a common misconception that faces seen in highly stressful situations can be 
"burned into" a witness's memory. Consequently, the amount of stress inflicted on an 
eyewitness has the potential to impair a jury's ability to fairly and accurately weigh 
reliability, because jurors may incorrectly assume that stress increases reliability. In 
addition, stress may also interact with other factors to compound unreliability. Studies 
demonstrate, for example, that witnesses are more likely to overestimate short durations 
of time in high-stress situations than in low-stress situations. See Elizabeth F. Loftus et 
al., Time Went by so Slowly: Overestimation of Event Duration by Males and Females, 1 
11 Applied Cognitive Psychol 3 (1987) (so stating). 
12 B. Witness Attention 
13 In assessing eyewitness reliability, it is important to consider not only what 
14 was within the witness's view, but also on what the witness was actually focusing his or 
15 her attention. It is a common misconception that a person's memory operates like a 
16 videotape, recording an exact copy of everything the person sees. Studies show, 
17 however, that memory in fact works much differently. A person's capacity for processing 
18 information is finite, and the more attention paid to one aspect of an event decreases the 
19 amount of attention available for other aspects. Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, 
20 Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test 
21 in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 Law & Hum Behav 1, 10-11 (2009). 
22 One commonly encountered example of that fact is the weapon-focus 
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1 effect. Studies consistently show that the visible presence of a weapon during an 
2 encounter negatively affects memory for faces and identification accuracy because 
3 witnesses tend to focus their attention on the weapon instead of on the face or appearance 
4 of the perpetrator, or on other details of the encounter. See, e.g., Kerri L. Pickel, 
5 Remembering and Identifying Menacing Perpetrators: Exposure to Violence and the 
6 Weapon Focus Effect, in 2 The Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology: Memory for People 
7 339 (R.C.L. Lindsay et al., eds., 2007). That diminished attention factor frequently 
8 impairs the witness's ability to encode things such as facial details into memory, resulting 
9 in decreased accuracy in later identifications. Although the weapon-focus effect is 
10 perhaps the most well-documented illustration regarding the effects of witness 
11 distraction, some studies indicate that the effect is not limited to dangerous or threatening 
12 objects but, in fact, extends to any object that attracts the witness's attention by virtue of 
13 being unusual or out of place in the context in which it is encountered. See id. at 353-54 
14 ( discussing experiments involving unusual rather than threatening items). Studies have 
15 documented similar impairment of identification performance when witnesses viewed the 
16 target holding unusual, but nonthreatening, objects like a stalk of celery or a toy doll. Id. 
17 The negative effect of weapon-focus on identification accuracy may be 
18 magnified when combined with stress, short exposure times, poor viewing conditions, or 
19 longer retention intervals,13 and may also result in less accurate initial descriptions of the 
20 perpetrator. Id.; Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus 
13 The term "retention interval" refers to the duration of time between the 
witness's initial observation of the perpetrator and the identification event. 
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1 Effect, 16 Law & Hum Behav 413,417 (1992). In addition, evidence regarding a 
2 witness's attention is particularly susceptible to the inflating effects of confirming 
3 feedback. Studies demonstrate that witnesses generally do not contemporaneously 
4 observe their own degree of attention or other viewing conditions as they observe an 
5 event. Gary L. Wells, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to Eyewitnesses 
6 Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J Applied Psychol 360 (1998). 
7 Thus, when asked later how closely they were paying attention, witnesses may rely more 
8 heavily on external context clues -- like confimring feedback -- than on independent 
9 recollection. 
10 C. Duration of Exposure 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Scientific studies indicate that longer durations of exposure (time spent 
looking at the perpetrator) generally result in more accurate identifications. Brian H. 
Bornstein et al., Effects of Exposure Time and Cognitive Operations on Facial 
Identification Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of Two Variables Associated with Initial 
Memory Strength, 18 Psychology, Crime & Law 473 (2012). One meta-analysis shows 
that the beneficial effect of longer exposure time on accuracy is greatest between the 
shortest durations, up to approximately 30 seconds. Id. In contrast, for durations over 30 
seconds, only substantial increases in exposure time produced marked improvement in 
witness performance. Id. However, it is impossible to determine conclusively that any 
particular duration of exposure is too short to make an accurate identification, nor so long 
as to entirely eliminate the possibility of a mistaken identification. Indeed, at least one 
study has noted decreases in identification accuracy with longer viewing durations, in 
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1 cases where the appearance of the person to be identified has changed significantly 
2 between the identification and the initial viewing. J. Don Read et al., Changing Photos 
3 of Faces: Effects of Exposure Duration and Photo Similarity on Recognition and the 
4 Accuracy-Confidence Relationship, 16 Experimental Psycho!: Learning, Memory, and 
5 Cognition 870 (Sept 1990). 
6 Studies also show that witnesses consistently and significantly overestimate 
7 short durations of time (generally, durations of 20 minutes or less), especially during 
8 highly stimulating, stressful, or unfamiliar events. Loftus, Time Went by so Slowly, 1 
9 Applied Cognitive Psychol 3; A. Daniel Yarmey, Retrospective Duration Estimations for 
10 Variant and Invariant Events in Field Situations, 14 Applied Cognitive Psychol 45 
11 (2000). 
12 D. 
13 
Environmental Viewing Conditions 
The conditions under which an eyewitness observes an event can 
14 significantly affect the eyewitness's ability to perceive and remember facts regarding that 
15 event. Although we limit our discussion here to the basic environmental conditions of 
16 distance and lighting, we have already noted that any aspect of a viewing environment 
17 can potentially impair an eyewitness's ability to clearly view an event or a perpetrator. 
18 Unsurprisingly, studies confirm that visual perception decreases with either 
19 distance or diminished lighting. In the case of distance, unlike variables subject to 
20 probability determinations, scientists have identified certain dispositive endpoints beyond 
21 which humans with normal, unaided vision are physically incapable of discerning facial 
22 features. Studies also show that witnesses who receive post-identification feedback 
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1 confirming the validity of their identification tend to report more favorable initial viewing 
2 conditions than witnesses who do not receive such feedback. Wells, et al., "Good, You 
3 Identified the Suspect": Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the 
4 Witnessing Experience, 83 J Applied Psychol 360 (1998). 
5 E. Witness Characteristics and Condition 
6 An eyewitness's ability to perceive and remember varies with the witness's 
7 physical and mental characteristics. Although different witnesses and fact patterns may 
8 implicate different variables, some common variables that affect the ability to perceive 
9 and remember include visual acuity, physical and mental condition (illness, injury, 
10 intoxication, or fatigue), and age. Studies demonstrate, for example, that intoxicated 
11 witnesses are more likely to misidentify an innocent suspect than their sober counterparts. 
12 See Jennifer E. Dysart et al., The Intoxicated Witness: Effects of Alcohol on Identification 
13 Accuracy from Showups, 87 J Applied Psychol 170 (2002) (finding that 78 percent of 
14 participants with blood alcohol levels less than .04 percent correctly rejected a showup 
15 where the perpetrator was absent, while only 48 percent of participants with higher blood 
16 alcohol levels -- averaging .09 percent -- did so). 
17 Age can also significantly affect the reliability of a witness's identification, 
18 memory, and perception. Studies show that children and elderly witnesses are generally 
19 less likely to make accurate identifications than adults, especially in target-absent 
20 conditions. Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann Rev 
21 Psycho! 277, 280 (2003). 
22 
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1 F. Description 
2 Contrary to a common belief, studies reveal that there is little correlation 
3 between a witness's ability to describe a person and the witness's ability to later identify 
4 that person. Christian A. Meissner et al., Person Descriptions as Eyewitness Evidence, in 
5 2 The Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology: Memory for People 3 (R.C.L. Lindsay et al., 
6 eds., 2007). Indeed, some studies show a negative effect on identification accuracy after 
7 witnesses have attempted to produce a composite of a suspect or provide detailed verbal 
8 descriptions of facial features, a development that might result from the different 
9 cognitive mechanisms employed to verbally describe faces as opposed to recognizing 
10 them. Id. Other studies indicate that witnesses who focus on memorizing particular 
11 facial features at a viewing rather than on the face as a whole may be able to better 
12 describe those features, but tend to perform less accurately in later identification 
13 procedures. Id. 
14 G. 
15 
16 
Perpetrator Characteristics -- Distinctiveness, Disguise, and Own-Race Bias 
Witnesses are better at remembering and identifying individuals with 
17 distinctive features .than they are those possessing average features. See Peter N. Shapiro 
18 & Steven Penrod, Meta-Analysis of Facial Identification Studies, 100 Psycho! Bull 139 
19 (1986) (summarizing results of a number of studies on target distinctiveness). However, 
20 identification accuracy drops significantly when an individual's facial features have 
21 changed since the witness's initial observation. K.E. Patterson & A.D. Baddeley, When 
22 Face Recognition Fails, 3 Experimental Psychol 406,410 (1977) (finding that 
23 recognition performance dropped by over 50 percent when researchers manipulated the 
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1 target's facial appearance after the initial opportunity to view by changing hairstyles or 
2 adding or removing facial hair). Similarly, studies confirm that the use of a disguise 
3 negatively affects later identification accuracy. In addition to accoutrements like masks 
4 and sunglasses, studies show that hats, hoods, and other items that conceal a perpetrator's 
5 hair or hairline also impair a witness's ability to make an accurate identification. See, 
6 e.g., Brian L. Cutler, A Sample of Witness, Crime, and Perpetrator Characteristics 
1 Affecting Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 4 Cardozo Pub L Pol'y & Ethics J 327, 332 
8 (2006) (summarizing cumulative results of six studies showing that identification 
9 accuracy dropped from 57 percent to 44 percent when perpetrator hair and hairline cues 
10 were masked). 
11 Studies also indicate that witnesses are significantly better at identifying 
12 members of their own race than those of other races. See Christian A. Meisner & John C. 
13 Brigham; Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-
14 Analytic Review, 7 Psycho!, Pub Pol'y, & L 3 (2001) (summarizing results of three 
15 decades of studies demonstrating effect of own-race bias in eyewitness identifications). 
16 Indeed, one study found that cross-racial identifications were 1.56 times more likely to be 
17 incorrect than same-race identifications. Conversely, subjects were 2.2 times more likely 
18 to accurately identify a person of their own race than a person of another race. Id. at 15-
19 16 (2001). Despite widespread acceptance of the cross-racial identification effect in the 
20 scientific community, fewer than half of jurors surveyed understand the impact of that 
21 factor. Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Juror's Understanding of 
22 Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 Jurimetrics 177, 200 (2006). 
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1 H. Speed of Identification (Response Latency) 
2 Accurate identifications generally tend to be made faster than inaccurate 
3 identifications. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewimess Evidence: Improving Its Probative 
4 Value, 7 Psycho! Sci Pub Int 45, 67-68 (2006). Some researchers posit that faster 
5 identifications correlate with accuracy because the automatic cognitive process associated 
6 with facial recognition operates faster than the deliberative cognitions used to make 
7 relative judgments, a process that is more likely to result in misidentification. Id. 
8 The usefulness of that variable is nevertheless limited by the fact that 
9 studies have been unable to agree upon the exact boundaries of the effect. Id. One study 
10 found that the most accurate identifications were made within 10 to 12 seconds. Id. 
11 ( citing David Dunning & Scott Perretta, Automaticity and Eyewitness Accuracy: A 10-12 
12 Second Rule for Distinguishing Accurate from Inaccurate Positive Identifications, 
13 Applied Psychol, 87, 951-962 (2002)). A later study, however, noted a positive 
14 correlation to accuracy with response times ranging from five to 29 seconds, but also 
15 found that identifications made faster than those optimal time boundaries were not highly 
16 accurate. Id. (citing Nathan Weber et al., Eyewimess Identification Accuracy and 
17 Response Latency: The Unruly 10-12 Second Rule, Experimental Psycho! Applied, 139-
18 147 (2004)). 
19 It is worth noting that, although identification speeds can be measured 
20 objectively by the administrator of the identification procedure, witnesses' self-reports 
21 regarding their deliberative process -- i.e., how long it took the witness to make an 
22 identification, how difficult it was, whether the defendant just "popped out" at them, or 
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1 whether the witness employed a process of elimination or other relative judgment to 
2 arrive at the identification -- are not highly reliable. Id. As with self-reports concerning 
3 many of the other factors previously discussed, witnesses' perception of their own 
4 deliberative process can be manipulated by suggestive procedures and confirming 
5 feedback. Id. Additionally, studies have shown that suggestive identification procedures 
6 can result in quicker identifications without any corresponding increase in accuracy. See, 
7 e.g., David F. Ross et al., When Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses Look the Same: A 
8 Limitation of the Pop-Out' Effect and the 10- to 12-Second Rule, 21 Applied Cognitive 
9 Psychol 677-90 (2007). 
10 I. Level of Certainty 
11 Despite widespread reliance by judges and juries on the certainty of an 
12 eyewitness's identification, studies show that, under most circumstances, witness 
13 confidence or certainty is not a good indicator of identification accuracy. Regarding 
14 prospective certainty -- the witness's confidence prior to the identification procedure in 
15 his or her ability to make an identification -- a number of meta-analytic studies have 
16 found no correlation between certainty and identification accuracy. In contrast, 
17 retrospective certainty -- witness confidence in the accuracy of their identification after it 
18 has occurred -- may have a weak correlation with accuracy. See Gary L. Wells & 
19 Elizabeth A. Olsen, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann Rev Psychol 277,283 (2003) 
20 ( describing studies). The effect, however appears only within the small percentage of 
21 extremely confident witnesses who rated their certainty at 90 percent or higher, and even 
22 those individuals were wrong 10 percent of the time. Id. 
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1 Research also shows that retrospective self-reports on eyewitness certainty 
2 are highly susceptible to suggestive procedures and confirming feedback, a factor that 
3 further limits the utility of the certainty variable. Wells, "Good, You Identified the 
4 Suspect," 83 J Applied Psychol 360. Witnesses who receive confirming feedback -- i.e., 
5 are told or otherwise made aware that they made a correct identification -- report higher 
6 levels of retrospective confidence than witnesses who receive either no feedback or 
7 disconfirming feedback. Id. It appears, moreover, that confirming feedback may inflate 
8 confidence to a greater degree in mistaken identifications than in correct identifications. 
9 See, e.g., Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the 
10 Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J Applied 
11 Psychol 112, 115 (2002) (reporting that inaccurate witness self-reports increased from an 
12 average of 49 percent certain to an average of 67 percent certain after receiving 
13 confirming feedback, while the same feedback increased accurate witnesses' certainty 
14 only from an average of 80 percent to 85 percent). 
15 Finally, we note that witness certainty, although a poor indicator of 
16 identification accuracy in most cases, nevertheless has substantial potential to influence 
17 jurors. Studies show that eyewitness confidence is the single most influential factor in 
18 juror determinations regarding the accuracy of an eyewitness identification. See, e.g., 
19 Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness 
20 Identification, 64 J Applied Psychol 440,446 (1979); Michael R. Leippe et al., Cueing 
21 Confidence in Eyewitness Identifications: Influence of Biased Lineup Instructions and 
22 Pre-Identification Memory Feedback Under Varying Lineup Conditions, 33 Law & Hum 
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Behav 194, 194 (2009) (summarizing prior research). Jurors, however, tend to be 
unaware of the generally weak relationship between confidence and accuracy, and are 
also unaware of how susceptible witness certainty is to manipulation by suggestive 
procedures or confirming feedback. See, e.g., Tanja R. Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory 
is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to 
Eyewitness Experts, 20 Applied Cognitive Psychol 115, 120 (2006) (finding that only 38 
percent of jurors surveyed correctly understood the relationship between accuracy and 
confidence and only 50 percent of jurors recognized that witnesses' confidence can be 
manipulated). As a result, jurors consistently tend to overvalue the effect of the certainty 
variable in determining the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. 
11 J. Memory Decay (Retention Interval) 
12 It is a well-known fact that memory decays over time. The more time that 
13 elapses between an initial observation and a later identification procedure ( a period 
14 referred to in eyewitness identification research as a "retention interval") -- or ev~n a 
15 subsequent attempt to recall the initial observation -- the less reliable the later 
16 recollection will be. An aspect of memory decay that is less well known, however, is that 
17 decay rates are exponential rather than linear, with the greatest proportion of memory loss 
18 occurring shortly after an initial observation, then leveling off over time. See Kenneth A. 
19 Deffenbacher, Forgetting the Once-Seen Face: Estimating the Strength of an 
20 Eyewitness's Memory Representation, 14 J Experimental Psycho!: Applied 139, 148 
21 (2008). As a result, the difference in reliability between an identification made 10 
22 minutes after an incident and one made two hours after an incident maybe significantly 
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1 greater than the difference between an identification made two weeks after an incident 
2 and one made two months after the same incident. 
3 Estimating the effect of memory decay, however, turns in large part on the 
4 strength and quality of the initial memory encoded; a witness forgets, over time, only 
5 what was encoded into the witness's memory to begin with. Scientists generally agree 
6 that memory never improves. Henderson, 208 NJ at 267. Consequently, memory decay 
7 must be viewed in conjunction with other variables that affect the initial encoding of 
8 memories, such as cross-racial identification, weapon-focus, degree of attention, distance, 
9 lighting, and duration of initial exposure. 
10 II. SYSTEM VARIABLES 
11 A. Blind Administration 
12 In police lineup identifications, research shows that lineup administrators 
13 who know the identity of the suspect often consciously or unconsciously suggest that 
14 information to the witness. Steven E. Clark et al., Lineup Administrator Influences on 
15 Eyewitness Identification Decisions, 15 J Experimental Psychol: Appl 63 (2009). In the 
16 most obvious cases of improper suggestion, a lineup administrator may tell a witness 
17 outright who the putative suspect in a lineup is, or otherwise make other comments 
18 suggesting the suspect's identity. However, studies show that, even in the absence of 
19 suggestive verbal communication, lineup administrators can nevertheless convey 
20 suggestive information to witnesses nonverbally through tone of voice, pauses, 
21 demeanor, facial expressions, and body language. Such nonverbal communications may 
22 be difficult to detect and prevent. Indeed, studies show that both witnesses and 
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1 administrators are generally unconscious of the influence that the lineup administrator's 
2 behavior has on identification process. See Ryauu M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of 
3 Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 J Applied 
4 Psychol 1106, 1110 (2004) (summarizing findings of other studies). That said, however, 
5 administrator knowledge significantly affects reliability. 
6 To guard against that influence, experts recommend that all identification 
7 procedures be conducted by a "blind" administrator -- a person who does not know the 
8 identity of the suspect. To realize the full value of blind administration, witnesses should 
9 also be advised of that fact in order to prevent them from attempting to infer suggestive 
10 information from an administrator's words or conduct. 
11 B. Pre-identification Instructions 
12 Studies show that the likelihood of misidentification is significantly 
13 decreased when witnesses are instructed prior to an identification procedure that a suspect 
14 may or may not be in the lineup or photo array, and that it is permissible not to identify 
15 anyone. Indeed, one study found that in target-absent14 lineup procedures, witnesses who 
16 were warned that the perpetrator might not be in the lineup misidentified a suspect only 
17 33 percent of the time, compared to 78 percent of the witnesses not so instructed. Roy S. 
14 
"Target-absent" refers to a lineup or photo array that does not contain the 
suspect. Target-absent lineups occur in actual practice when the police officials 
mistakenly fix their suspicion on an innocent person. Scientific research on target-absent 
lineups is particularly relevant to the reliability of identifications because nearly all 
wrongful convictions based on eyewitness misidentification result from target-absent 
procedures. That is so because when the target (the actual perpetrator) is present, 
misidentifications will generally implicate only known-innocent foils, and therefore be 
immediately recognized as mistakes. 
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1 Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions and the 
2 Absence of the Offender, 66 J Applied Psychol 482,485 (1981). There appears to be 
3 little downside to giving such instructions. According to a 2005 meta-analysis, unbiased 
4 instructions greatly increased correct suspect rejections in target-absent lineups, but had 
5 no appreciable effect on the rate of correct identifications in target-present lineups. 
6 Steven E. Clark, A Re-examination of the Effects of Biased Lineup Instructions in 
1 Eyewitness Identification, 29 Law & Hum Behav 395, 397 (2005). 
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C. Lineup Construction 
An identification procedure is essentially a pseudo-scientific experiment 
conducted by law enforcement officials to test their hypothesis that a particular suspect is, 
in fact, the perpetrator that they seek. Wells & Olsen, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann Rev 
Psychol 277,285 (2003). However, like any experiment, the validity of the results 
depends largely on the careful design and unbiased implementation of the underlying 
procedures. The purpose behind embedding a suspect in a group of "filler" subjects 
known to be innocent is to test the witness's memory. If, however, the suspect stands out 
from the other subjects in any way that might lead the witness to select the suspect based 
17 on something other than her own memory, the experiment fails to achieve its purpose. 
18 Experts generally recommend that the subjects used as lineup fillers should 
19 be selected first on the basis of their agreement with the witness's description of the 
20 perpetrator; if no description of a particular feature is available, then experts recommend 
21 that lineup fillers be chosen based on their similarity to the suspect. Roy S. Malpass et 
22 al., Lineup Construction and Lineup Fairness, in 2 The Handbook of Eyewitness 
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Psychology: Memory for People 155, 157-58 (R.C.L. Lindsay et al., eds., 2007); National 
Institute of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Just, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law 
Enforcement 29 (1999). If a suspect differs significantly from the witness's description, 
the lineup fillers should be matched to the suspect rather than the description in order to 
prevent the suspect from standing out. Id. Suspects should not be displayed in 
distinctive clothing or in clothing that matches the witness's description unless all of the 
lineup fillers are also dressed alike; a suspect's distinctive features -- scars, tattoos, etc. --
should either be concealed or artificially added to all of the lineup fillers. Id. Lineups 
should contain only one suspect and utilize a sufficient number of fillers to minimize the 
likelihood that a witness will select the suspect based on chance rather than memory. Id. 
Most sources recommend a minimum of five fillers to one suspect. Id. Any increase in 
the number of lineup fillers correspondingly decreases the probability of misidentification 
occurring by chance alone. Ultimately, if for any reason a suspect disproportionately 
stands out from the lineup fillers surrounding him or her, then the identification 
procedure is suggestive -- and the reliability of any resulting identification decreases 
16 correspondingly. 
17 D. Simultaneous versus Sequential Lineups 
18 In traditional identification procedures, a number of persons or photographs 
19 are displayed simultaneously to an eyewitness. Some studies demonstrate, however, that 
20 witnesses permitted to view all the subjects together have a tendency to make a "relative 
21 judgment" -- choosing the person or photograph that most closely resembles the 
22 perpetrator from among the other subjects -- as opposed to making an "absolute 
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1 judgment" - comparing each subject to their memory of the perpetrator and deciding 
2 whether that subject is the perpetrator or not. Relative judgments process have been 
3 found to increase the likelihood of misidentification, especially in target-absent lineups. 
4 To correct that problem, researchers recommend an alternative lineup procedure in which 
5 the witness is presented with each individual person or photograph sequentially. Because 
6 the witness views only one person or photograph at a time, researchers posit that the 
7 witness is less able to engage in relative judgment, and thus less likely to misidentify 
8 innocent suspects. Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewimess Accuracy Rates in Sequential and 
9 Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 Law & Hum 
IO Behav 459, 463-64 (2001). Studies show a moderate trend toward fewer 
11 misidentifications in sequential lineups than in simultaneous lineups. Id. at 463-64 
12 (reporting that, in the combined results of 30 experiments collected from 19 previous 
13 research papers, 51 percent of witnesses presented with simultaneous target-absent 
14 lineups misidentified a person, while only 28 percent did so in sequential lineups). 
15 Other recent studies, however, challenge the validity of that finding, 
16 cautioning that the different outcomes in sequential and simultaneous lineups may be 
17 attributable to other factors. Specifically, some research shows that sequential lineups 
18 may result in more misidentifications when not conducted by a blind administrator, and 
19 that other factors such as differing methods of witness instruction and questioning may 
20 explain the difference in results. Dawn McQuiston-Surrett et al., Sequential vs. 
21 Simultaneous Lineups: A Review of Methods, Data, and Theory, 12 Psycho! Pub Pol'y & 
22 L 137, 143-51 (2006); Roy S. Malpass, et al., Public Policy and Sequential Lineups, 14 
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1 Legal & Criminological Psychology 1 (2009). 
2 E. Showups 
3 A "showup" is a procedure in which police officers present an eyewitness 
4 with a single suspect for identification, often (but not necessarily) conducted in the field 
5 shortly after a crime has taken place. Showups are widely regarded as inherently 
6 suggestive -- and therefore less reliable than properly administered lineup identifications 
7 -- because the witness is always aware of who police officers have targeted as a suspect. 
8 Furthermore, unlike lineups, showups have no mechanism to distinguish witnesses who 
9 are guessing from those who actually recognize the suspect. In an unbiased lineup, an 
10 unreliable witness will often be exposed by a "false positive" response identifying a 
11 known innocent subject. By contrast, because showups involve a lone suspect, every 
12 witness who guesses will positively identify the suspect, and every positive identification 
13 is regarded as a "hit." For that reason, misidentifications that occur in showups are less 
14 likely to be discovered as mistakes. 
15 Despite those shortcomings, some research indicates that, when conducted 
16 properly and within a limited time period immediately following an incident, showups 
17 can be equally as reliable as lineups. Showups are most likely to be reliable when they 
18 occur immediately after viewing a criminal perpetrator in action, ostensibly because the 
19 benefits of a fresh memory outweigh the inherent suggestiveness of the procedure. In as 
20 little as two hours after an event occurs, however, the likelihood of misidentification in a 
21 showup procedure increases dramatically. In one study, the immediate showup 
22 identification of an innocent suspect produced a misidentification rate of 18 percent 
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1 ( compared to 16 percent in an immediate lineup); a delay of only two hours increased the 
2 misidentification rate to 58 percent (compared to 14 percent in a lineup). David A. 
3 Yarmey et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups and Lineups, 20 Law 
4 & Hum Behav 459, 464 (1996). 
5 Studies also demonstrate that showups pose a particularly high risk of 
6 misidentification for innocent suspects who happen to look like the perpetrator. A 2003 
7 meta-analysis found that, when an innocent suspect closely resembled a perpetrator, 23 
8 percent of witnesses misidentified the suspect in a showup, compared to 17 percent of the 
9 witnesses presented with the same suspect in a lineup. Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness 
10 Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic 
11 Comparison, 27 Law & Hum Behav 523, 533 (2003). In addition, witnesses at a showup 
12 may be more inclined to base their identifications on clothing rather than on facial 
13 features. Studies indicate that showups present an especially high risk of 
14 misidentification for suspects wearing clothing similar to that of the perpetrator. Jennifer 
15 E. Dysart et al., Show-Ups: The Critical Issue of Clothing Bias, 20 Applied Cognitive 
16 Psychology 1009 (2006). 
17 F. 
18 
19 
20 
Multiple Viewings (Mugshot Exposure, Mugshot Commitment, Source Monitoring 
Errors, Source Confusion) 
Viewing a suspect multiple times throughout the course of an investigation 
21 adversely affects 1:J?.e reliability of any identification that follows those viewings. 
22 Researchers posit that the negative effect of multiple viewings may result from the 
23 witness's inability to discern the source of his or her recognition of the suspect, an 
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1 occurrence referred to as source confusion or a source monitoring error. Because of the 
2 possibility of source confusion, once a witness has viewed the suspect in any context 
3 other than the initial incident, it is impossible to determine whether a subsequent 
4 identification is based on the observation of the initial incident or on the subsequent 
5 viewing of the suspect. 
6 Researchers have identified several specific types of multiple viewing 
7 problems that often occur in eyewitness identifications. One, referred to as "mugshot 
8 exposure," occurs when police officials have a witness peruse random mugshots on file 
9 from previous cases in an attempt to generate leads. Studies show that prior exposure to 
10 an innocent suspect's mugshot increases the likelihood that the witness will subsequently 
11 misidentify the suspect as the peipetrator, based on the witness's sense of recognition 
12 generated by the previously viewed picture. Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Mugshot 
13 Exposure Effects: Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commihnent, Source Confusion, 
14 and Unconscious Transference, 30 Law & Hum Behav 287 (2006). The mugshot 
15 exposure problem can be exacerbated when the witness actually identifies an innocent 
16 person's mugshot as someone who is, or resembles, the peipetrator, resulting in a related 
17 e:ff ect ref erred to as "mugshot commitment." When a later identification procedure 
18 includes the person whose mugshot the witness previously identified, studies show that 
19 witnesses are disproportionately likely to remain "committed" to the person whose 
20 mugshot they had previously selected. Id. 
21 A similar problem occurs when a witness is asked to participate in multiple 
22 identification procedures. Whether or not the witness selects the suspect in an initial 
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1 identification procedure, the procedure increases the witness's familiarity with the 
2 suspect's face. If the witness is later presented with another lineup in which the same 
3 suspect appears, the suspect may tend to stand out or appear familiar to the witness as a 
4 result of the prior lineup, especially when the suspect is the only person repeated in both 
5 lineups. Henderson, 208 NJ at 255-56; Deffenbacher, Mugshot Exposure Effects, 30 Law 
6 & Hum Behav at 299. As with mugshot exposure, the problem is exacerbated if a 
7 witness actually identifies a suspect in an initial lineup or photo array. In subsequent 
8 identification procedures, such witnesses are likely to simply remain committed to the 
9 person that they initially identified rather than reexamine their initial memory of the 
10 perpetrator. Henderson, 208 NJ at 256; see also David F. Ross et al., Unconscious 
11 Transference and Mistaken Identity: When a Witness Misidentifies a Familiar but 
12 Innocent Person, 79 Applied Psychol 918,929 (discussing another study that found that 
13 89 percent of subjects who misidentified a person in an initial, target-absent lineup also 
14 misidentified the same person in a second lineup -- despite the fact that the second lineup 
15 also contained the true perpetrator). For those reasons, successive identification 
16 procedures can be unreliable as tests of a witness's memory regarding an actual 
17 perpetrator, and thus may have little probative value. 
18 Yet another facet of the multiple viewing problem is the phenomenon of 
19 unconscious transference. Studies have found that witnesses who, prior to an 
20 identification procedure, have incidentally but innocently encountered a suspect may 
21 unconsciously transfer the familiar suspect to the role of criminal perpetrator in their 
22 memory. See Ross, Unconscious Transference and Mistaken Identity, 79 J Applied 
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1 Psychol 918 (1994). The phenomenon is most problematic when a witness is vaguely 
2 familiar with a suspect but unconscious of why that is so. The result, often, is that the 
3 witness mistakenly attributes that familiarity to having previously observed the suspect at 
4 the crime scene. See J. D. Read et al., The Unconscious Transference Effect: Are 
5 Innocent Bystanders Ever Misidentified?, 4 Applied Cognitive Psychol 26 (1990) (noting 
6 that, to produce unconscious transference errors, a witness's familiarity with the suspect's 
7 face must not be "so high as to elicit recall of the misidentified person's correct context or 
8 identity"). 
9 Although multiple viewings of a suspect always introduce a degree of 
10 doubt as to the reliability of an identification, studies suggest that witnesses may be most 
11 susceptible to source monitoring errors when their initial memory trace is weakest. See, 
12 e.g., Deffenbacher, Mugshot Exposure Effects, 30 Law & Hum Behav at 288 (noting that 
13 "failure of memory for facial source or context is all the more problematic when viewing 
14 of the perpetrator has occurred under less than optimal viewing conditions"). Thus, the 
15 presence of estimator variables indicating weak initial encoding may magnify the 
16 suggestive effects of multiple viewings. 
17 G. 
18 
19 
20 
Suggestive Questioning, Cowitness Contamination, and Other Sources of Post-
Event Memory Contamination 
The way in which eyewitnesses are questioned or converse about an event 
21 can alter their memory of the event. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Guido Zanni, Eyewitness 
22 Testimony: The Influence of the Wording of a Question, 5 Bull Psychonomic Soc'y 86 
23 (1975). Studies show that the use of suggestive wording and leading questions tend to 
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1 result in answers that more closely fit the expectation embedded in the question. For 
2 example, in one study, participants who had viewed a short video of a traffic accident 
3 were asked various questions about what they had seen in the video. Id. Although there 
4 was no broken headlight in the video, participants who were asked "Did you see the 
5 broken headlight?" were more than twice as likely to answer "Yes" than those who were 
6 asked "Did you see a broken headlight?" Id. ( emphasis added). 
7 Witness memory, moreover, can become contaminated by external 
8 information or assumptions embedded in questions or otherwise communicated to the 
9 witness. In one study, participants were asked, after viewing a short video, to estimate 
10 the speed of a car in the video either "when it passed the barn" or without mention of a 
11 barn. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 Cognitive 
12 Psychol 560,566 (1975). One week later, the participants were asked whether they had 
13 seen a barn in the video. Id. Although there was no barn in the video, 17 percent of the 
14 subjects who had been asked the question presupposing the existence of a barn reported 
15 having seen the barn, compared to two percent of the subjects to whom no barn had been 
16 mentioned. Id. 
17 Another study found that participants' estimations of a vehicle's speed 
18 differed according to whether a question used the words "collided," "bumped," 
19 "contacted," "hit," or "smashed" to describe the taped car accident that they viewed. 
20 Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An 
21 Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J Verbal Leaming & 
22 Verbal Behav 585 (1974). Participants who were asked how fast the cars were going 
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1 when they "smashed" into each other estimated an average speed of 40.5 miles per hour, 
2 whereas participants who were presented with the same question using the word "hit" or 
3 "contacted" estimated average speeds of 34.0 and 31.8 miles per hour, respectively. Id. at 
4 586. A follow-up experiment found that participants questioned using the word 
5 "smashed" were more than twice as likely to erroneously report seeing broken glass in the 
6 video as participants questioned using the word "hit" or not questioned at all. Id. at 587. 
7 Post-event memory contamination is generally categorized as a system 
8 variable because state actors are often the entities engaged in questioning eyewitnesses to 
9 crimes. That said, however, witness memory is equally susceptible to contamination by 
IO nonstate actors. One common source of third-party memory contamination is cowitness 
11 interaction. When a witness is permitted to discuss the event with other witnesses or 
12 views another witness's identification decision, the witness may alter his or her own 
13 memory or identification decision to conform to that of the cowitness. Elin M. 
14 Skagerberg, Co-Witness Feedback in Line-Ups, 21 Applied Cognitive Psychol 489 
15 (2007). In one study, half of the participants were shown a sequence of photographs 
16 illustrating a theft involving a single person, while the other half viewed the same theft 
17 but with two persons. Id. at 490 ( discussing another study). When questioned 
18 individually, 97 percent of the participants correctly remembered the number of people 
19 involved in the theft that they viewed. Id. However, after discussing the event with 
20 another participant who had viewed the alternate scenario, one of the participants in more 
21 than 75 percent of the pairs changed their answer to conform to their partner's 
22 recollections. Id. 
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1 H. 
2 
Suggestive Feedback and Recording Confidence 
As noted above, post-identification confinning feedback tends to falsely 
3 inflate witnesses' confidence in the accuracy of their identifications, as well as their 
4 recollections concerning the quality of their opportunity to view a perpetrator and an 
5 event. Confirming feedback, by definition, takes place after an identification and thus 
6 does not affect the result of the identification itself. It does, however, falsely inflate 
7 witness confidence in the reports they tender regarding many of the factors commonly 
8 used by courts and jurors to gauge eyewitness reliability. As a result, the danger of 
9 confirming feedback lies in its tendency to increase the appearance of reliability without 
IO increasing reliability itself. 
11 The detrimental effects of post-identification feedback are well-established 
12 in the scientific literature. One much-cited study on the effects of post-identification 
13 confirming feedback staged an experiment in which witnesses, after making an incorrect 
14 identification from a target-absent lineup, were told either, "Good, you identified the 
15 suspect," "Actually, the suspect was number __," or given no feedback at all. The 
16 witnesses were then asked to answer questions regarding the incident and the 
17 identification task. The study found that the witnesses who received confirming feedback 
18 were not only more certain in the accuracy of their identification, but also reported 
19 having had a better view of the perpetrator, noticing more details of the perpetrator's face, 
20 paying closer attention to the event they witnessed, and making their identifications 
21 quicker and with greater ease than participants who were given no feedback or 
22 disconfirming feedback. Wells, "Good, You Identified the Suspect," 83 J Applied 
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1 Psychol 360 (1998). A more recent meta-analysis examining the results of20 
2 experiments involving over 2,400 participants confirmed that studies on this factor have 
3 produced "remarkably consistent" effects, and "provide dramatic evidence that post-
4 identification feedback can compromise the integrity of a witness's memory." Amy B. 
5 Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-Analysis of the 
6 Post-Identification Feedback Effect, 20 Applied Cognitive Psycho! 859, 865-66 (2006). 
7 Witnesses often receive confirming feedback from the administrator of the 
8 identification procedure directly after making an identification, but they may also obtain 
9 feedback from other sources, such as news accounts identifying the suspect as the 
10 perpetrator, conversations with other witnesses, or pretrial witness preparation sessions. 
11 Skagerberg, Co-Witness Feedback in Line-Ups, 21 Applied Cognitive Psychol 489 
12 (2007). Indeed, eyewitnesses who are subsequently called to testify in criminal 
13 proceedings are always subjected to some degree of confirming feedback because they 
14 can inf er that they identified the right person from the fact that the state is prosecuting the 
15 suspect they identified. 
16 To moderate the effect of this factor, researchers recommend that 
17 administrators of identification procedures record the witness's certainty statements 
18 immediately after an identification has been made, and before the witness is given any 
19 feedback. Some studies have reported moderate success in inoculating witnesses against 
20 the effects of confirming feedback by asking the witnesses to reflect or report on their 
21 level of certainty prior to being given confirming feedback. Gary L. Wells & Amy L. 
22 Bradfield, Distortions in Eyewitnesses' Recollections: Can the Postidentification-
79 
1 Feedback Effect Be Moderated?, 10 Psycho! Sci 138 (1999). 
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MODEL EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTION 
This instruction should be given in any case in which the jury heard eyewitness evidence that 
positively identified the defendant and in which the identification of the defendant as the person who 
committed or participated in the alleged crime(s) is contested. Where there is no positive 
identification but a partial identification of the defendant. as discussed in Commonwealth v. Franklin, 
465 Mass. 895, 910-12 (2013), this instruction or "some variationn of it should be given upon 
request. The instruction is set forth at 473 Mass. 1051 (2015). 
The Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is the person who committed (or participated in) 
the alleged crime(s). If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant is the person who committed (or participated in) the 
alleged crime(s), you must find the defendant not guilty. 
Where a witness has identified the defendant as the person who 
committed (or participated in) the alleged crime(s), you should examine the 
identification with care. As with any witness, you must determine the 
witness's credibility, that is, do you believe the witness is being honest? 
Even if you are convinced that the witness believes his or her identification 
is correct, you still must consider the possibility that the witness made a 
mistake in the identification. A witness may honestly believe he or she saw 
a person, but perceive or remember the event inaccurately. You must 
Instruction 9.160 Page 2 
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decide whether the witness's identification is not only truthful, but accurate. 
People have the ability to recognize others they have seen and to 
accurately identify them at a later time, but research and experience have 
shown that people sometimes make mistakes in identification. 
The mind does not work like a video recorder. A person cannot just 
replay a mental recording to remember what happened. Memo_ry and 
perception are much more complicated} Remembering something requires 
three steps. First, a person sees an event. Second, the person's mind 
stores information about the event. Third, the person recalls stored 
information. At each of these stages, a variety of factors may affect - or 
even alter - someone's memory of what happened and thereby affect the 
accuracy of identification testimony.ii This can happen without the witness 
being aware of it. 
I am going to list some factors that you should consider in 
determining whether identification testimony is accurate. 
11. Opportunity to view the event. I You should consider the opportunity 
the witness had to observe the alleged offender at the time of the event. 
For example, how good a look did the witness get of the person and for 
how long? How much attention was the witness paying to the person at 
Page 3 Instruction 9.160 
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that time? How far apart were the witness and the person? How good 
were the lighting conditions? You should evaluate a witness's testimony 
about his or her opportunity to observe the event with care.m 
a. ff there was evidence that a disguise was involved or the alleged offender's 
face was obscured. 
You should consider whether the person was disguised or had 
his or her facial features obscured. For example, if the person 
wore a hat, mask, or sunglasses, it may affect the witness's 
ability to accurately identify the person.iv 
l b. If there was evidence that the alleged offender had a distinctive face or feature. I 
You should consider whether the person had a distinctive face 
or feature. v 
I c. ff there was evidence that a weapon was involved. I You should consider 
whether the witness saw a weapon during the event. If the 
event is of short duration, the visible presence of a weapon may 
distract the witness's attention away from the person's face. 
But the longer the event, the more time the witness may have to 
get used to the presence of a weapon and focus on the person's 
face.vi 
Instruction 9.160 Page 4 
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2. Characteristics of the witness. You should consider the physical and 
mental characteristics of the witness when the observation was made. For 
example, how good was the witness's eyesight? Was the witness 
experiencing illness, injury, or fatigue? Was the witness under a high level 
of stress? High levels of stress may reduce a person's ability to make an 
accurate identification.vu 
a. If there was evidence that the witness and the person identified are family 
members, friends, or longtime acquaintances. 
If the person identified is a witness's family member, friend, or 
longtime acquaintance, you should consider the witness's prior 
familiarity with the person.viii 
I b. If there was evidence that drugs or alcohol were involved. I You should 
consider whether, at the time of the observation, the witness 
was under the influence of alcohol or drugs and, if so, to what 
degree. 
-~ 
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Omit the following instruction only if all parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification. 
The trial judge has the discretion to add the references to ethnicity to the instruction. See 
Commonwealth v. Basta/do, 472 Mass. 16, 29-30 (2015). 
1
3. Cross-racial identification~ I 
L-. ____________ __. If the witness and the person 
identified appear to be of different races (or ethnicities), you should 
consider that people may have greater difficulty in accurately identifying 
someone of a different race {or ethnicity) than someone of their own race 
( or ethnicity)_ix 
14, Passage of time. You should consider how much time passed 
between the event observed and the identification. Generally, memory is 
most accurate immediately after the event and begins to fade soon 
thereafter. x 
1 s, Expressed certainty. , You may consider a witness's identification 
even where the witness is not free from doubt regarding its accuracy. But 
you also should consider that a witness's expressed certainty in an 
identification, standing alone, may not be a reliable indicator of the 
accuracy of the identification,xi especially where the witness did not 
Instruction 9.160 Page 6 
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describe that level of certainty when the witness first made the 
identification. xii 
1 s, Exposure to outside information, I You should consider that the 
accuracy of identification testimony may be affected by information that the 
witness received between the event and the identification,xiii or received 
after the identification.xiv Such information may include identifications 
made by other witnesses, physical descriptions given by other witnesses, 
photographs or media accounts, or any other information that may affect 
the independence or accuracy of a witness's identification.xv Exposure to 
such information not only may affect the accuracy of an identification, but 
also may affect the witness's certainty in the identification and the 
witness's memory about the quality of his or her opportunity to view the 
event.xvi The witness may not realize that his or her memory has been 
affected by this information.xvii 
An identification made after suggestive conduct by the police or 
others should be scrutinized with great care. Suggestive conduct may 
include anything that a person says or does that might influence the 
witness to identify a particular individua1.xvm Suggestive conduct need not 
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be intentional, and the person doing the "suggesting" may not realize that 
he or she is doing anything suggestive. xix 
j 1. Identification procedures. , 
I a. If there was evidence of a photographic array or a lineup. I An identification 
may occur through an identification procedure conducted by 
police, which involves showing the witness a (set of 
photographs) (lineup of individuals). Where a witness identified 
the defendant from a (set of photographs) (lineup), you should 
consider all of the factors I have already described about a 
witness's perception and memory. You also should consider 
the number of (photographs shown) (individuals in the lineup), 
whether anything about the defendant's (photograph) (physical 
appearance in the lineup) made the defendant stand out from 
the others,xx whether the person (showing the photographs) 
(presenting the lineup) knew who was the suspect and could 
have, even inadvertently, influenced the identification,xxi and 
whether anything was said to the witness that may have 
influenced the identification. xxn You should consider that an 
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identification made by picking a defendant out of a group of 
similar individuals is generally less suggestive than one that 
results from the presentation of a defendant alone to a witness. 
b. Upon request, the judge should also give an instruction about the source 
of the defendant's photograph within the array. 
You have heard that the police showed the witness a number of 
·photographs. The police have photographs of people from a 
variety of sources, including the Registry of Motor Vehicles. 
You should not make any negative inference from the fact that 
the police had a photograph of the defendant. 
I C. If there was evidence of a showup. I An identification may occur 
through an identification procedure conducted by police known 
as a showup, in which only one person is shown to a witness. 
A showup is more suggestive than asking a witness to select a 
person from a group of similar individuals, because in a showup 
only one individual is shown and the witness may believe that 
the police consider that individual to be a potential suspect.xxm 
You should consider how much time has passed between the 
event and the showup because the risk of an inaccurate 
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identification arising from the inherently suggestive nature of a 
showup generally increases as time passes.xxiv 
d. If there was evidence of a photographic array, lineup, or showup. You should 
consider whether the police, in showing the witness (a set of 
photographs) (a lineup) (a showup), followed protocols 
established or recommended by the Supreme Judicial Court or 
the law enforcement agency conducting the identification 
procedure that are designed to diminish the risk of suggestion. 
If any of those protocols were not followed, you should evaluate 
the identification with particular care. 
The trial judge may take judicial notice of police protocols regarding eyewitness identification that 
have been established or recommended by the Supreme Judicial Court, and include in the 
instruction those established or recommended protocols that are relevant to the evidence in the 
case. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 604 {2011) ("Unless there are exigent or 
extraordinary circumstances, the police should not show an eyewitness a photographic array ... 
that contains fewer than five fillers for every suspect photograph. . . . We expect police to follow 
our guidance to avoid this needless risk"); Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 797-
98 {2009) {"What is practicable in nearly all circumstances is a protocol to be employed before a 
photographic array is provided to an eyewitness, making clear to the eyewitness, at a minimum 
that: he will be asked to view a set of photographs; the alleged wrongdoer may or may not be in 
the photographs depicted in the array; it is just as important to clear a person from suspicion as to 
identify a person as the wrongdoer; individuals depicted in the photographs may not appear 
exactly as they did on the date of the incident because features such as weight and head and 
facial hair are subject to change; regardless of whether an identification is made, the investigation 
will continue; and the procedure requires the administrator to ask the witness to state, in his or her 
own words, how certain he or she is of any identification"); id. at 798 ("We decline at this time to 
hold that the absence of any protocol or comparable warnings to the eyewitnesses requires that 
the identifications be found inadmissible, but we expect such protocols to be used in the future"); 
id. at 797 ("We have yet to conclude that an identification procedure is unnecessarily suggestive 
unless it is administered by a law enforcement officer who does not know the identity of the 
suspect [double-blind procedure], recognizing that it may not be practicable in all situations. At 
the same time, we acknowledge that it is the better practice [compared to a non-blind procedure] 
because it eliminates the risk of conscious or unconscious suggestion"). If the Legislature were to 
establish police protocols by statute, the judge should instruct the jury that they may consider 
Instruction 9.160 Page 10 
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protocols established by the Legislature. The judge also may take judicial notice of those 
protocols and include them in the instruction. 
The trial judge also may include established or recommended procedures where the evidence 
shows that they were established or recommended by the law enforcement agency conducting the 
investigation at the time of _the identification procedure. 
e. If there was evidence of a multiple viewings of the defendant by 
the same witness. 
You should consider whether the witness viewed the defendant 
in multiple identification procedures or events. When a witness 
views the same person in more than one identification 
procedure or event, it may be difficult to know whether a later 
identification comes from the witness's memory of the original 
event, or from the witness's observation of the person at an 
earlier identification procedure or event.xxv 
8. Failure to identify or inconsistent identification. You should 
consider whether a witness ever failed to identify the defendant, or made 
an identification that was inconsistent with the identification that the 
witness made at the trial. 
19, Totality of the evidence, I In evaluating the accuracy of a witness's 
identification, you should consider all of the relevant factors that I have 
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discussed, in the context of the totality of the evidence in this case. 
Specifically, you should consider whether there was other evidence in the 
case that tends to support or to cast doubt upon the accuracy of an 
identification. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant is the person who committed (or participated in) the alleged 
crime(s), you must find the defendant not guilty. 
NOTES: 
1. Expert testimony. Whether to permit expert testimony on the general reliability of eyewitness 
identifications generally rests in the judge's discretion. The weight of authority is against the general admissibility 
of such expert testimony, but some jurisdictions favor its admission if special factors are present (typically, lack of 
corroboration, or discrepancies, concerning the identification). At least where there is other evidence 
corroborating the identification, the admissibility of such evidence is consigned to the judge's discretion. Before 
admitting such evidence the judge must, at minimum, find that it meets the general requirements for expert 
testimony: that it is relevant to the circumstances of the identification; that it will help, rather than confuse or 
mislead, the jury; that the underlying basis of the opinion, and any tests or assumptions, are reliable; and that the 
opinion is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case so that it will aid the jury in resolving the matter. General 
acceptance by other experts is a factor, but is not controlling. Commonwealth v. Santoli, 424 Mass. 837, 841-45 
(1997); Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 419 Mass. 815,818 (1995); Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 95-102 
(1983); Commonwealth v. Weichel/, 390 Mass. 62, 77-78 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984); 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 501-02 (1972) {psychological characteristics and dangers of recall are 
probably "well within the experience of" ordinary jurors). Expert testimony on a particular witness's visual acuity is 
proper. Commonwealth v. Sowers, 388 Mass. 207, 215-16 (1983). 
2. Other potential perpetrators. A defendant is entitled to introduce evidence tending to show that 
someone else committed the crime or had motive, opportunity, and intent to do so, provided such evidence is not 
~ too remote in time, probatively weak, or irrelevant. Doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of admissibility. 
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378, 387-88 (1989); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 282 Mass. 593, 597-98 
(1933); Commonwealth v. Walker, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 544, 552 (1982); Commonwealth v. Magnasco, 4 Mass. App. 
Ct. 144, 147-48 {1976). This may include evidence of other recent, similar crimes by similar methods. 
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 286, 291 (1985). A judge, however, should exclude evidence of 
other, allegedly similar crimes by another perpetrator where they are insufficiently proximate in time and location, 
or where they do not share similar features. Commonwealth v. Brown, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 75-76 (1989). 
3. Evidence of prior identifications. A witness's testimony as to his own prior identification is 
admissible to corroborate his in-court identification, and is not hearsay. Commonwealth v. Nassar, 351 Mass. 37, 
42 (1966) (photograph); Commonwealth v. Locke, 335 Mass. 106, 112 (1956) (lineup). A third party may testify as 
to another witness's prior identification even in the absence of any in-court identification and even when the 
witness denies having made an identification. Commonwealth v. Le, 444 Mass. 431, 438 (2005). A third party's 
testimony is also admissible to impeach an identification witness who now denies having made the prior 
identification. Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 60 (1984); Commonwealth v. Swenson, 368 Mass. 268,274 
(1975). Where a witness is unavailable after a good faith, unsuccessful effort to obtain his or her testimony, 
evidence of his prior in-court identification is admissible if it was made under oath and subject to 
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cross-examination; it may be admitted by means of a transcript or by the testimony of someone who was present. 
Commonwealth v. Furtick, 386 Mass. 477,480 {1982); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 385 Mass. 733, 740-49 
{1982). The Supreme Judicial Court has held that this doctrine is consistent with Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004), where "a reasonable person in the [witness's] position would not have anticipated this his 
statement would be used against the defendant in prosecuting the crime." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 451 
Mass. 672, 680 {2008). 
4. Reliability. If the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that a prior identification was 
unnecessarily suggestive in all the circumstances, the identification may not be admitted at trial. Article 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights requires this rule of per se exclusion of out-of-court identification evidence, 
without regard to reliability, whenever the identification has been obtained through unnecessarily suggestive 
confrontation procedures. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 420 Mass. 458, 461-64 {1995). Massachusetts thus 
follows the former Wade-Gilbert-Stovall Federal rule instead of the current reliable-in-the-totality-of-circumstances 
rule adopted in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). Any subsequent identifications may be admitted 
only if the prosecution proves by clear and convincing evidence that they have an independent source, considering 
(1) the extent of the witness's opportunity to observe the perpetrator at the time of the crime {the "most important 
[factor] because the firmer the contemporaneous impress ion, the less the witness is subject to the influence of 
subsequent events/ Commonwealth v. Bodden, 391 Mass. 356, 361 {1984 )); (2) any prior errors in description; 
(3) any prior errors in identifying another person; (4) any prior failures to identify the defendant; (5) any other 
suggestions; and (6) the lapse of time between the crime and the identification. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 420 
Mass. 458, 464 (1995); Commonwealth v. Botelho, 369 Mass. 860, 869 (1976). 
As to other reliability issues, see Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 261-67 (2014) (in-court 
identification against an equivocal out-of-court identification); Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 233-45 
(2014) (in-court identification in the absence of an out-of-court identification); Commonwealth v. Harris, 395 Mass. 
296, 299-300 (1985) (one-on-one confrontations); Commonwealth v. Weichel/, 390 Mass. 62, 68-73 (1983) 
(composite drawings); Commonwealth v. Porter, 384 Mass. 647, 657-58 (1981) (showing single photo); 
Commonwealth v. Simmons, 383 Mass. 46, 49-53 (1981) (identification of inanimate object); Commonwealth v. 
Venios, 378 Mass. 24, 29 (1979) (showing single photo); Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 376 Mass. 468,476 (1978) 
(identification in presence ofother witnesses); Commonwealth v. Marini, 375 Mass. 510, 516-17 (1978) (voice 
identification); Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 372 Mass. 783, 787-88 (1977) (initial failure to identify does not bar 
later positive identification), overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1, 6-11 (2002); 
Commonwealth v. Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 741-45 (1977) (one-on-one confrontations); Commonwealth v. Lacy, 
371 Mass. 363, 368-69 (1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 360 Mass. 557, 562 (1971) (weight of 
identification testimony is for jury); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 104 Mass. 545, 547 (1870) (several 
non-positive identifications can provide proof beyond reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Amorin, 14 Mass. App. 
Ct. 553, 555 (1982) (one-on-one confrontations); Commonwealth v. Walker, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 544, 550-51 (1982) 
(same); Commonwealth v. Marks, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 511, 515-16 (1981) (same); Commonwealth v .. Bishop, 9 
Mass. App. Ct. 468, 471-73 (1980) (weight of uncertain identification is for jury); Commonwealth v. Jones, 9 Mass. 
App. Ct. 83, 92-93 (1980) (same); Commonwealth v. Cincotta, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 817 (doubts as to reliability 
not of constitutional dimension are matters of weight for jury), aff'd, 379 Mass. 391 (1979). 
ENDNOTES TO MODEL INSTRUCTION: 
1 See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 369 (2015); Supreme Judicial Court Study Group 
on Eyewitness Evidence: Report and Recommendations to the Justices 15 (July 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness-evidence-report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/WY4M-
YNZN] (Study Group Report), quoting Report of the Special Master, State v. Henderson, N.J. Supreme Ct., 
No. A-8-08, at 9 (June 10, 2010) (Special Master's Report) rThe central precept is that memory does not 
function like a videotape, accurately and thoroughly capturing and reproducing a person, scene or event. ... 
Memory is, rather[,] a constructive, dynamic and selective process"); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 245 
(2011 ); State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 771 (2012) (Appendix); see also E.F. Loftus, J.M. Doyle, & J.E. Dysart, 
Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal§ 2-2, at 14 (5th ed. 2013) {Loftus et al.). 
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11 See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 16, quoting Henderson, 208 N.J. at 245 (three stages 
involved in forming memory: acquisition - "the perception of the original event"; retention - "the period of 
time that passes between the event and the eventual recollection of a particular piece of information"; and 
retrieval - "the stage during which a person recalls stored information"). 
For a detailed.discussion of the three stages of memory and how those stages may be affected, see 
Study Group Report, supra note i, at 15-17; National Research Council of the National Academies, Identifying 
the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 59-69 (2014) (National Academies) ("Encoding, storage, and 
remembering are not passive, static processes that record, retain, and divulge their contents in an 
informational vacuum, unaffected by outside influences"); see also State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 235-36 
(2012); Henderson, 208 N.J. at 247; Loftus et al., supra note i, at§ 2-2, at 15 ("Numerous factors at each 
stage affect the accuracy and completeness of an eyewitness account"). 
m See D. Reisberg, The Science of Perception and Memory: A Pragmatic Guide for the Justice 
System 51-52 (2014) (witnesses may not accurately remember details, such as length of time and distance, 
when describing conditions of initial observation); see also Lawson, 352 Or. at 744 (information that witness 
receives after viewing event may falsely inflate witness's "recollections concerning the quality of [his or her] 
opportunity to view a perpetrator and an event"). 
Iv See Study Group Report, supra note i ,at 30, quoting Lawson, 352 Or. at 775 (Appendix) ("[S]tudies 
confirm that the use of a disguise negatively affects later identification accuracy. In addition to accoutrements 
like masks and sunglasses, studies show that hats, hoods, and other items that conceal a perpetrator's hair 
or hairline also impair a witness's ability to make an accurate identification"); Henderson, 208 N.J. at 266 
("Disguises and changes in facial features can affect a witness'[s] ability to remember and identify a 
perpetrator"); State v. Clop ten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1108 (Utah 2009) ("[A]ccuracy is significantly affected by 
factors such as the amount of time the culprit was in view, lighting conditions, use of a disguise, 
distinctiveness of the culprit's appearance, and the presence of a weapon or other distractions"); Wells & 
Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psycho!. 277, 281 (2003) (Wells & Olson) ("Simple disguises, 
even those as minor as covering the hair, result in significant impairment of eyewitness identification"); see 
also Cutler, A Sample of Witness, Crime, and Perpetrator Characteristics Affecting Eyewitness Identification 
Accuracy, 4 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol'y & Ethics J. 327, 332 (2006) ("In data from over 1300 eyewitnesses, the 
percentage of correct judgments on identification tests was lower among eyewitnesses who viewed 
perpetrators wearing hats [44%] than among eyewitnesses who viewed perpetrators whose hair and hairlines 
were visible [57%]"). 
v See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 30-31, quoting Lawson, 352 Or. at 77 4 (Appendix) 
("Witnesses are better at rem em be ring and identifying individuals with distinctive features than they are those 
possessing average features"); Clopten, 223 P.3d at 1108; Wells & Olson, supra note iv, at 281 ("Distinctive 
faces are much more likely to be accurately recognized than nondistinctive faces" but "what makes a face 
distinctive is not entirely clear"); see also Shapiro & Penrod, Meta-Analysis of Facial Identification Studies, 100 
Psycho!. Bull. 139, 140, 145 (1986) (meta-analysis finding that distinctive targets were "easier to recognize 
than ordinary looking targets"). 
v1 See Study Group Report, supra at 130 ("A weapon can distract the witness and take the witness's 
attention away from the perpetrator's face, particularly if the weapon is directed at the witness. As a result, 
if the crime is of short duration, the presence of a visible weapon may reduce the accuracy of an identification. 
In longer events, this distraction may decrease as the witness adapts to the presence of the weapon and 
focuses on other details"); Guilbert, 306 Conn. at253; Lawson, 352 Or. at771-72 (Appendix); see a/so Kassin, 
Hosch, & Memon, On the "General Acceptance" of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New Survey of the 
Experts, 56 Am. Psycho!. 405, 407-12 (2001) (Kassin et al.) (in 2001 survey, eighty-seven per cent of experts 
agree that principle that "[t]he presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitness's ability to accurately identify the 
perpetrator's face" is reliable enough to be presented in court); Maass & Kohnken, Eyewitness Identification: 
Simulating the "Weapon Effect," 13 Law & Hum. Behav. 397, 405-06 (1989); Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review 
of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 413, 415-17 (1992) (meta-analysis finding "weapon-
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absent condition[s] generated significantly more accurate descriptions of the perpetrator than did the weapon-
present condition"); id. at 421 ("To not consider a weapon's effect on eyewitness performance is to ignore 
relevant information. The weapon effect does reliably occur, particularly in crimes of short duration in which 
a threatening weapon is visible"); Wells & Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the 
Supreme Court's Reliability Test in light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 1, 
11 (2009) (Wells & Quinlivan). But see National Academies, supra note ii, at 93-94 (recent meta-analysis 
"indicated that the effect of a weapon on accuracy is slight in actual crimes, slightly larger in laboratory studies, 
and largest for simulations"). 
vii See Gomes, 470 Mass. at 372-73; Study Group Report, supra note i, at 29, quoting Special Master's 
Report, supra note i, at 43 (while moderate levels of stress might improve accuracy, "eyewitness under high 
stress is less likely to make a reliable identification of the perpetrator"); Lawson, 352 Or. at 769 (Appendix); 
see also Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress 
on Eyewitness Memory, 28 Law & Hum. Behav. 687, 699 (2004) (finding "considerable support for the 
hypothesis that high levels of stress negatively impact both accuracy of eyewitness identification as well as 
accuracy of recall of crime-related details"); Morgan, Hazlett, Doran, Garrett, Hoyt, Thomas, Baranoski, & 
Southwick, Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense 
Stress, 27 lnt'I J.L. & Psychiatry 265, 272-74 (2004). But see Study Group Report, supra note i, quoting 
Henderson, 208 N.J. at 262 ("There is no precise measure for what constitutes 'high' stress, which must be 
assessed based on the facts presented in individual cases"). 
viii See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 135 (recommending instruction stating, "If the witness had 
seen the defendant before the incident, you should consider how many times the witness had seen the 
defendant and under what circumstances"); see also Pezdek & Stolzenberg, Are Individuals' Familiarity 
Judgments Diagnostic of Prior Contact?, 20 Psychol. Crime & L. 302, 306 (2014) (twenty-three per cent of 
study participants misidentified subjects with unfamiliar faces as familiar, and only forty-two per cent correctly 
identified familiar face as familiar); Read, The Availability Heuristic in Person Identification: The Sometimes 
Misleading Consequences of Enhanced Contextual Information, 9 Applied Cognitive Psycho I. 91, 94-100 
(1995). See generally Coleman, Newman, Vidmar, & Zoeller, Don't I Know You?: The Effect of Prior 
Acquaintance/Familiarity on Witness Identification, Champion, Apr. 2012, at 52, 53 rTo a degree/ increased 
interaction time may produce "marginally more accurate identifications," but increased interaction time may 
also generate more incorrect identifications); Schwartz, Memory for People: Integration of Face, Voice, Name, 
and Biographical Information, in SAGE Handbook of Applied Memory 9 (2014) ("familiarity exists on a 
continuum from very familiar [your spouse's face] to moderately familiar [the face of the person who works 
downstairs] to completely unfamiliar (a person you have never met]. Unfortunately, little research directly 
addresses the continuum from [familiar] to unfamiliar"). 
Ix See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 31 ("A witness may have more difficulty identifying a 
person of a different race or ethnicity"); Kassin et al., supra note vi, at 407-12 (in 2001 survey, ninety per cent 
of experts agree that principle that "[e]yewitnesses are more accurate when identifying members of their own 
race than members of other races" is reliable enough to be presented in court); Meissner & Brigham, Thirty 
Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 Psychol., Pub. 
Pol'y, & L. 3, 15 (2001) (meta-analysis of thirty-nine research articles concluding that participants were "1.4 
times more likely to correctly identify a previously viewed own-race face when com pared with performance 
on other-race faces" and "1.56 times more likely to falsely identify a novel other-race face when compared with 
performance on own-race faces"); Wells & Olson, supra note iv, at 280-81; see also Commonwealth v. 
Zimmerman,441 Mass.146, 154-55 (2004) (Cordy, J., concurring); State v. Cabagbag, 127 Haw. 302, 310-11 
(2012); Lawson, 352 Or. at 775 (Appendix); National Academies, supra note ii, at 96, citing Grimsley, 
Innocence Project, What Wrongful Convictions Teach Us About Racial Inequality, Innocence Blog (Sept. 26, 
2012, 2:30 f..M.), at http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/What_Wrongful_Convictions_Teach_Us_About_Racial_lnequality.php [http://perma.cc/KX2J-XECNJ 
("Recent analyses rev ea led that cross-racia I [mis ]identification was present in 42 percent of the cases in which 
an erroneous eyewitness identification was made"). 
In Basta/do, 472 Mass. at 28-29, the court concluded that there is "not yet a near consensus in the 
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relevant scientific community that people are generally less accurate at recognizing the face of someone of 
a different ethnicity than the face of someone of their own ethnicity" (emphasis added). However, there are 
studies that "support the conclusion that people are better at recognizing the faces of persons of the same 
ethnicity than a different ethnicity." Id.; see Gross, Own-Ethnicity Bias in the Recognition of Black, East Asian, 
Hispanic and White Faces, 31 Basic & Applied Social Psychol. 128, 132 (2009) (study revealed that white 
participants recognized white faces better than they recognized Hispanic, Asian, and black faces, but found 
no significant difference between Hispanic participants' recognition of white faces and Hispanic faces); Platz 
& Hosch, Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness Identification: A Field Study, J. Applied Social Psycho!. 972, 979, 
981 (1988) (Mexican-American and white convenience store clerks better recognized customers of their own 
group than customers of other group); see also Chiroro, Tredoux, Radaelli, & Meissner, Recognizing Faces 
Across Continents: The Effect of Within-Race Variations on the Own-Race Bias in Face Recognition, 15 
Psychonom ic Bull. & Rev. 1089, 1091 (2008) (white South African participants better recognized white South 
African faces than white North American faces, and black South African participants better recognized black 
South African faces than black North American faces). 
x See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 31-32, quoting Lawson, 352 Or. at 778 (Appendix) ("The 
more time that elapses between an initial observation and a later identification procedure [a period referred 
to in eyewitness identification research as a 'retention interval'] ... the less reliable the later recollection will 
be .... [D]ecay rates are exponential rather than linear, with the greatest proportion of memory loss occurring 
shortly after an initial observation, then leveling off over time"); National Academies, supra note ii, at 15 ("For 
eyewitness identification to take place, perceived information must be encoded in memory, stored, and 
subsequently retrieved. As time passes, m em cries become less stable"). 
x1 See Gomes, 470 Mass. at 370-71; Study Group Report, supra note i, at 19 ("Social science research 
demonstrates that little correlation exists between witness confidence and the accuracy of the identification"); 
Lawson, 352 Or. at 777 (Appendix) ("Despite widespread reliance by judges and juries on the certainty of an 
eyewitness's identification, studies show that, under most circumstances, witness confidence or certainty is 
not a good indicator of identification accuracy"); Clop ten, 223 P.3d at 1108; see also Commonwealth v. Cruz, 
445 Mass. 589, 597-600 (2005); Commonwealth v. Santoli, 424 Mass. 837, 845-46 (1997); Commonwealth 
v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99, 110 n.9 (1996). 
xii See Henderson, 208 N.J. at 254 ("to the extent confidence may be relevant in certain 
circumstances, it must be recorded in the witness'[s] own words" before any possible influence from any 
extraneous information, known as feedback, that confirms witness's identification); Lawson, 352 Or. at 745 
("Retrospective self-reports of certainty are highly susceptible to suggestive procedures and confirming 
feedback, a factor that further limits the utility of the certainty variable"); Wells & Bradfield, Distortions in 
Eyewitnesses' Recollections: Can the Postidentification-Feedback Effect Be Moderated?, 10 Psycho I. Sci. 
138, 138 (1999) (Distortions) ("The idea that confirming feedback would lead to confidence inflation is not 
surprising. What is surprising, however, is that confirming feedback that is given after the identification leads 
eyewitnesses to misremember how confident they were at the time of the identification"); see a/so 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228,239 (2014) ("Social science research has shown that a witness's 
level of confidence in an identification is not a reliable predictor of the accuracy of the identification, especially 
where the level of confidence is inflated by [an identification procedure's) suggestiveness"). 
xiu See Gomes, 470 Mass. at 373-74; Study Group Report, supra note i, at 21-22; Special Master's 
Report, supra note i, at 30-31 ("An extensive body of studies demonstrates that the memories of witnesses 
for events and faces, and witnesses' confidence in their memories, are highly malleable and can readily be 
altered by information received by witnesses both before and after an identification procedure"); Lawson, 352 
Or. at 786 (Appendix) ("The way in which eyewitnesses are questioned or converse about an event can alter 
their memory of the event"). 
xiv See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 22, quoting Henderson, 208 N.J. at 255 (postidentification 
feedback "affects the reliability of an identification in that it can distort memory, create a false sense of 
confidence, and alter a witness'[s] report of how he or she viewed an event"); Special Master's Report, supra 
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note i, at 33 ("A number of studies have demonstrated that witnesses' confidence in their identifications, and 
their memories of events and faces, are readily tainted by information that they receive after the identification 
procedure"); Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, The Eyewitness Post Identification Feedback Effect 15 Years Later: 
Theoretical and Policy Implications, 20 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 1, 11 (2014) ("Confirming feedback 
significantly inflates eyewitness reports on an array of testimony-relevant measures, including attention to and 
view of the crime event, ease and speed of identification, and certainty of the identification decision"); see also 
Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 263 (2014) ("Where confirmatory feedback artificially inflates an 
eyewitness's level of confidence in his or her identification, there is also a substantial risk thatthe eyewitness's 
memory of the crime at trial will 'improve'"). 
xv See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 22, quoting Lawson, 352 Or. at 788 (Appendix) ("[T}he 
danger of confirming feedback [whether from law enforcement, other witnesses, or the media] lies in its 
tendency to increase the appearance of reliability without increasing reliability itself'); Henderson, 208 N.J. 
at 253 ("Confirmatory or post-identification feedback presents the same risks. It occurs when police signal 
to eyewitnesses that they correctly identified the suspect"); Lawson, 352 Or. at 777-78 (Appendix); Hope, Ost, 
Gabbert, Healey, & Lenton, "With a Little Help from My Friends ... ": The Role of Co-Witness Relationship 
in Susceptibility to Misinformation, 127 Acta Psychologica 476, 481 (2008); Skagerberg, Co-Witness 
Feedback in Line-ups, 21 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 489,494 (2007) ("post-identification feedback does not 
have to be presented by the experimenter or an authoritative figure (e.g., police officer] in order to affect a 
witness'[s] subsequent crime-related judgments"). 
xvi See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 21-22; Henderson, 208 N.J. at 255; Lawson, 352 Or. at 
744; see a/so Douglass & Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-Analysis of the Post-
Identification Feedback Effect, 20 Applied Cognitive Psycho!. 859, 863-65 (2006) (participants who received 
confirming feedback "expressed significantly more retrospective confidence in their decision compared with 
participants who received no feedback"); Wells & Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to 
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psycho!. 360, 366-367 
(1998) (witnesses receiving confirming feedback reported "a better view of the culprit, a greater ability to make 
out details of the face, greater attention to the event, [and] a stronger basis for making an identification" 
compared to witnesses receiving no feedback); Distortions, supra note xii, at 140-43; National Academies, 
supra note ii, at 92-93 ("Research has ... shown that ... if an eyewitness hears information or mis information 
from another person before law enforcement involvement, his or her recollection of the event and confidence 
in the identification can be altered ... "). 
xvii See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 117, 136 n.4, citing Principles of Neural Science, Box 62-
1, at 1239 (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel! eds., 2000); see also Clark, Marshall, & Rosenthal, Lineup 
Administrator Influences on Eyewitness Identification Decisions, 15 J. Experimental Psycho!.: Applied 63, 72 
(2009) (Clark, Marshall, & Rosenthal) ("Most witnesses appeared to be unaware of the influence" of lineup 
administrator in staged experiment). 
xviii See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 140, quoting Wells & Quinlivan, supra note vi, at 6 ("From 
the perspective of psychological science, a procedure is suggestive if it induces pressure on the eyewitness 
to make a lineup identification [a suggestion by com mission], fails to relieve pressures on the witness to make 
a lineup selection (a suggestion by omission], cues the witness as to which person is the suspect, or cues the 
witness that the identification response was correct or incorrect"). 
xix See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 22-23, quoting Lawson, 352 Or. at 779 (Appendix) 
("research shows that lineup administrators who know the identity of the suspect often consciously or 
unconsciously suggest that information to the witness"); National Academies, supra note ii, at 91-92 ("Law 
enforcement's maintenance of neutral pre-identification communications - relative to the identification of a 
suspect- is seen as vital to ensuring thatthe eyewitness is not subjected to conscious or unconscious verbal 
or behavioral cues that could influence the eyewitness' identification"). 
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xx See Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 795, quoting Commonwealth v. Melvin, 399 Mass. 201,207 n.1 O 
(1987) ("we 'disapprove of an array of photographs which distinguishes one suspect from all the others on the 
basis of some physical characteristic'"); Wells & Olson, supra note iv, at 287 CUldeally, lineup fillers would be 
chosen so that an innocent suspect is not mistakenly identified merely from 'standing out,' and so that a culprit 
does not escape identification merely from blending in"); see also Henderson, 208 N.J. at 251; Lawson, 352 
Or. at 781 (Appendix); Malpass, Tredoux, & McQuiston-Surrett, Lineup Construction and Lineup Fairness, 
in 2 Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology 156 (2007) ("Decades of empirical research suggest that mistaken 
eyewitness identifications are more likely to occur when the suspect stands out in a lineup"). 
xx1 See Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 797 ("we acknowledge that [a double-blind procedure] is the 
better practice [com pared to a non-blind procedure] because it eliminates the risk of conscious or unconscious 
suggestion"); Study Group Report, supra note i, at 88 ("When showing a photo array or conducting a lineup, 
the police must use a technique that will ensure that no investigator present will know when the witness is 
viewing the sµspect. The preference is that the police have an officer who does not know who the suspect 
is administer the array or lineup"); Guilbert, 306 Conn. at 237-38 (courts across country accept that 
"identifications are likely to be less reliable in the absence of a double-blind, sequential identification 
procedure"); Henderson, 208 N.J. at 249 ("The consequences are clear: a non-blind lineup procedure can 
affect the reliability of a lineup because even the best-intentioned, non-blind administrator can act in a way 
that inadvertently sways an eyewitness trying to identify a suspect"); see also N~tional Academies, supra note 
ii, at 27 ("As an alternative to a double-blind array, some departments use 'blinded' procedures. A blinded 
procedure prevents an officer from knowing when the witness is viewing a photo of the suspect, but can be 
conducted by the investigating officer"); id. at 107 {"The committee [appointed by the National Academy of 
Sciences] recommends blind [double-blind or blinded] administration of both photo arrays and live lineups and 
the adoption of clear, written policies and training on photo array and live lineup administration. Police should 
use blind procedures to avoid the unintentional or intentional exchange of information that might bias an 
eyewitness"). 
xx1r See Clark, Marshall, & Rosenthal, supra note xvii, at 74 (subtle, nondirective statements by lineup 
administrator"can lead a witness to make an identification, particularly when the perpetrator was not present"); 
Malpass & Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. 
Applied Psycho!. 482, 486-87 (1981) (where subject witnesses were asked to identify assailant in staged 
experiment, "[c]hanging the instruction from biased [suspect is present in lineup] to unbiased [suspect may 
or may not be present] resulted in fewer choices and fewer false identifications without a decrease in correct 
identifications"). 
xx1u See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 26, citing Special Master's Report, supra note i, at 29 
(showups carry their own risks of misidentification "due to the fact that only one person is presented to the 
witness"); Lawson, 352 Or. at 742-43 ("A 'showup' is a procedure in which police officers present an 
eyewitness with a single suspect for identification, often [but not necessarily] conducted in the field shortly after 
a crime has taken place. Police showups are generally regarded as inherently suggestive - and therefore 
less reliable than properly administered lineup identifications- because the witness is always aware of whom 
police officers have targeted as a suspect"); Dysart & Lindsay, Show-up Identifications: Suggestive Technique 
or Reliable Method?, in 2 Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology 141 (2007) ("Overall, show-ups [fare] poorly 
when compared with line-ups. Correct identification rates are equal and false identification rates are about 
two to three times as high with show-ups compared with line-ups"); see also Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 797; 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 279 (2006) ("One-on-one identifications are generally disfavored 
because they are viewed as inherently suggestive"). 
xxlv See Lawson, 352 Or. at 783 (Appendix) ("Showups are most likely to be reliable when they occur 
immediately after viewing a criminal perpetrator in action, ostensibly because the benefits of a fresh memory 
outweigh the inherent suggestiveness of the procedure. In as little as two hours after an event occurs, 
however, the likelihood of misidentification in a showup procedure increases dramatically"); Yarmey, Yarmey, 
& Yarmey, Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups and Lineups, 20 Law & Hum. Behav. 459, 473 
(1996) ("Although showups conducted within [five minutes] of an encounter were significantly better than 
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chance, identifications performed [thirty minutes] or longer after a low-impact incident are likely to be 
unreliable"); Dysart & Lindsay, The Effects of Delay on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy: Should We Be 
Concerned?. in 2 Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology 370 (2007) (results of studies support conclusion that 
showups, "if they are to be used, should be used within a short period after the crime, perhaps a maximum 
of [twenty-four] hours," but acknowledging that "such a conclusion is highly speculative, given the minimal 
amount of data available"). 
}O('J See Gomes, 470 Mass: at 375-76; Study Group Report, supra note i, at 25, quoting Special 
Master's Report, supra note i, at 27-28 ("The problem is that successive views of the same person create 
uncertainty as to whether an ultimate identification is based on memory of the original observation or memory 
from an earlier identification procedure"); Henderson, 208 N.J. at 255; Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 
Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, and 
Unconscious Transference, 30 Law & Hum. Behav. 287, 306 (2006) (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod) 
("prior mugshot exposure decreases accuracy at a subsequent lineup, both in terms of reductions in rates for 
hits and correct rejections as well as in terms of increases in the rate for false alarms"). 
In Gomes, 470 Mass. at 376 n.37, quoting Study Group Report, supra note i, at 31, the Supreme 
Judicial Court noted that support for the phenomenon of "unconscious transference," which occurs "when a 
witness confuses a person seen at or near the crime scene with the actual perpetrator," was not as conclusive 
as the support for mugshot exposure. Unconscious transference nevertheless has substantial support and 
is relevant to the issue of multiple viewings of a person identified. See Study Group Report, supra note i, at 
31, quoting Special Master's Report, supra note i, at 46 ("The familiar person is at greater risk of being 
identified as the perpetrator simply because of his or her presence at the scene. . . . This 'bystander error' 
most commonly occurs when the observed event is complex, i.e., involving multiple persons and actions, but 
can also occur when the familiarity arises from an entirely unrelated exposure"); Lawson, 352 Or. at 785-86 
("Yet another facet of the multiple viewing problem is the phenomenon of unconscious transference. Studies 
have found that witnesses who, prior to an identification procedure, have incidentally but innocently 
encountered a suspect may unconsciously transfer the familiar suspect to the role of criminal perpetrator in 
their memory"); Guilbert, 306 Conn. at 253-54 ("the accuracy of an eyewitness identification may be 
undermined by an unconscious transference, which occurs when a person seen in one context is confused 
with a person seen in another"); see also Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, supra note xxv, at 301, 304-05 
(although negative impact of unconscious transference was less pronounced than that of mugshot exposure, 
both types of errors considered "products of the same basic transference design"); Ross, Ceci, Dunning, & 
Toglia, Unconscious Transference and Mistaken Identity: When a Witness Misidentifies a Familiar but 
Innocent Person, 79 J. Applied Psychol. 918,923 (1994) (witnesses in experiment who viewed bystander in 
staged robbery "were nearly three times more likely to misidentify the bystander than were control subjects" 
who did not view bystander). 

